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1. INTRODUCTION
The September 11 attacks and the ensuing military operations in Afghanistan have
raised a multitude of complex and disturbing problems for the existing humanitar-
ian normative order.3 Much of the legal scholarship on recent events concerning
Afghanistan has focused on the issues of the legal status of captured Taliban and
Al Qaeda soldiers under humanitarian law,4 their detention conditions at Guantana-
3. For the examination of the implications of both the September 11 attacks and the war against
Afghanistan on humanitarian law, see in particular, Y. Dinstein, 'Humanitarian Law on the Conflict in
Afghanistan', American Society of International Law Proceedings (2002) p. 23.
4. See inter alia, G.H. Aldrich, 'The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Comba-
tants', 96 AJIL (2002) p. 891, Editorial Comments; R. Cryer, 'The Fine Art of Friendship: Jus in Bello
in Afghanistan', 7 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2002) p. 37; M.H. Hoffman, 'Terrorists are
Unlawful Belligerents, not Unlawful Combatants: A Distinction with Implications for the Future of
International Humanitarian Law', 34 Case Western Reserve JIL (2002) p. 227; H.-P. Gasser, 'Acts of
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mo Bay in Cuba and the inadequacy of procedural safeguards for judicial proceed-
ings of the proposed Military Commissions5 under the US Presidential Order6 and
the Department of Defence Order.7 This paper takes a somewhat different ap-
proach, looking first at the legal characterisation of the armed conflicts in Afghani-
stan since 6/7 October 2001 and particularly the internecine hostilities that have
continued since the apparent end of the war, before examining the status of comba-
tants and that of prisoners of war. Clarification of the nature of the armed conflicts
and of the scope of application of the rules on prisoners of war is essential for
disentangling the legal quagmire surrounding the controversy over the legal status
of both Taliban and Al Qaeda soldiers under the jus in bello.
The analysis presented in this paper can be divided into five main areas. First,
the paper seeks to delineate the legal nature and characteristics of armed conflicts
that have been waged in Afghanistan since 6/7 October 2001.8 The author argues
that the Afghan 'war' can be considered as consisting of several armed conflicts,
each of which has a distinct normative nature. The establishment of the transitional
government, following the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghani-
stan pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions (the Bonn
Agreement) on 5 December 2001, constitutes a watershed for determining the legal
nature of ongoing armed conflicts against Taliban and Al Qaeda remainders.
Second, on the basis of the preceding analysis, the paper attempts to provide clarity as
to the criteria forprisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 and 1977
Additional Protocol I. In view of the non-ratification of the latter by the United States
and Afghanistan, it is essential to explore the customary law status of relevant rules.
Third, examination focuses on special categories of captured soldiers, namely,
the so-called 'unlawful combatants' or 'unprivileged belligerents', who do not
benefit from the rights and privileges of prisoners of war.
Fourth, the analysis turns to the conditions under which a 'competent tribunal'
may be established to determine the legal status of a captured soldier in accordance
Terror, Terrorism' and International Humanitarian Law', 84 RICR/IRRC (2002) p. 547; R.P. Master-
ton, 'Military Commissions and the War on Terrorism', 36 International Lawyer (2002) p. 1165; S.R.
Ratner, 'Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11', 96 AJIL (2002) p. 905, Notes and Com-
ments; and P. Rowe, 'Response to Terror: The New 'War", 3 Melbourne JIL (2002) p. 301.
5. See inter alia, CM. Evans, 'Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority to
Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists by Military Commission', 51 Duke LJ (2002) p. 1831;
J. Fitzpatrick, 'Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism', 96 AJIL
(2002) p. 345; H. Hongju Koh, 'The Case Against Military Commissions', 96 AJIL (2002) p. 337; M.
J. Matheson, 'U.S. Military Commissions: One of Several Options', 96 AJIL (2002) p. 354; D.A.
Mundis, 'The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts', 96
AJIL (2002) p. 320; J. Steyn, 'Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole', 53 ICLQ (2004) p. 1; and R.
Wedgwood, 'Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions', 96 AJIL (2002) p. 328.
6. President George W. Bush, Military Order of November 13, 2001, 'Detention, Treatment, and
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism', 66 Fed. Register, 16 November 2001, p.
57,833. See also Federal Register website, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov>.
7. US Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 (21 March 2002), 41 ILM(2002)
p. 725, available at< <http://defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf>.
8. The official date of the coalition's initiation of the attack was 6 October 2001, but it was on the
following day according to Afghan time.
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with Article 5 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention and Article 45(1) of Addi-
tional Protocol I.
Fifth, in view of the armed conflicts of a non-international character that exist in
Afghanistan, the types of humanitarian rules applicable to internal armed conflict
must be ascertained. Again, the absence of ratification of 1977 Additional Protocol
II by both the United States and Afghanistan necessitates an evaluation of custom-
ary rules applicable to non-international armed conflict.
The investigations of this paper are strictly confined to the Afghan context in
light of the five foregoing angles, excluding analysis of both the humanitarian rules
governing the conduct of hostilities and the conditions of detainees at detention
centres, most notably at Guantanamo Bay, and the procedural rules that should be
observed for trials of military commissions. At a time when the fallout of the war
against Iraq is keenly felt in terms of continuing guerrilla attacks carried out by
Baathist remnants and other militant groups against the Anglo-American occupy-
ing forces, revisiting the still live Afghan theatre and closely examining the rights
and privileges of captives through the juridical prism will enable us to gain useful
lessons regarding both the potential effectiveness and limits of humanitarian rules.
2. LEGAL CHARACTERISATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS IN
AFGHANISTAN SINCE 6/7 OCTOBER 2001
2.1 General overview
From a strict legal point of view, the war that has been, or is being, waged in
Afghanistan since the attack initiated by the US-led coalition forces on 6/7 October
2001 can be considered to consist of five separate conflicts, each of which is sub-
ject to a distinct normative regime.
Three types of armed conflicts in Afghanistan can be discerned in the period
between 6/7 October and 5 December 2001. First, there was an international armed
conflict between the US-led coalition and the Taliban government. Second, an
'armed conflict' between the coalition forces and Al Qaeda needs to be treated
separately from the conflict between the coalition and the Taliban in view of the
controversy over the humanitarian norms applicable to members of Al Qaeda, a
transnational terrorist organisation. Third, an armed conflict was fought between
the Northern Alliance and the Taliban government, which was prima facie an inter-
nal armed conflict but could be perceived as 'internationalised' by virtue of the
close link between the Northern Alliance and the coalition member states.9 Fourth,
since the coming into existence of the Karzai government, the Taliban forces have
been transformed into armed rebels or insurgents, to which Al Qaeda remnants are
thinly aligned. The fighting between the newly established governmental forces
and the anti-governmental 'coalition' forces of Islamic militants (consisting of the
9. Cf., T. Meron, 'Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua's Fallout',
92 AJIL (1998) p. 236.
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Taliban and Al Qaeda remainders and supporters of a Mujaheddin warlord, Gul-
buddin Hekmatyar) is classified as internal armed conflict, and not only the gov-
ernment but also insurgent troops are bound by customary law relating to internal
strife. Fifth, there is a continuing armed conflict between the US-led coalition
forces and the anti-government insurgents. Sixth, the armed hostilities between the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) acting in self-defence and the anti-
governmental rebels raises questions relating to the types of humanitarian rules
applicable to multilateral troops acting in furtherance of a Security Council enfor-
cement action.
2.2 The nature of hostilities prior to 5 December 2001
2.2.1 Armed conflict between the coalition forces and the Taliban:
international armed conflict
It is incontrovertible that the armed conflict between the US-led coalition and the
Taliban government was an international armed conflict, governed by international
humanitarian rules based on 'Hague rules' and 1949 Geneva Conventions I, III and
IV. While the applicability of 1977 Additional Protocol I to both the Taliban gov-
ernment and the US is hampered by their non-ratification of this treaty, some coali-
tion states are parties to it. Further, many rules embodied in Protocol I have
hardened into customary law10 and are applicable to both the coalition forces and
the Taliban government.
2.2.2 'Armed conflict' between the anti-terrorism coalition forces and Al
Qaeda
The regulatory framework of traditional humanitarian law does not foresee a sce-
nario such as the hostilities between the anti-terrorism coalition forces and Al Qae-
da.11 Al Qaeda is a transnational terrorist organisation which based its main
operational camps in Afghan territory under the auspices of the Taliban govern-
ment. Analysis of the applicability of humanitarian law to the conduct of warfare
by the coalition forces and by Al Qaeda requires examining the threshold question
as to whether there existed an 'armed conflict' between the coalition forces and Al
Qaeda in the sense of humanitarian law. Despite the internationalisation of the
conflict based on the military campaign carried out by UN-led coalition forces, it
seems that, at first glance, international humanitarian law does not apply. Common
Article 2(1) of the Geneva Conventions defines international armed conflict as 'all
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties'.
10. For analysis of customary humanitarian norms, see T. Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom
in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law', 90 AJIL (1996) p. 238.
11. Fitzpatrick, loc. cit. n. 5, at p. 8.
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Although loosely aligned with the Taliban regime, Al Qaeda is not an insurgent
in a non-international armed conflict,12 benefiting from the traditional practice of
belligerent recognition, now in disuse. Nor can Al Qaeda be considered oppressed
'peoples' entitled to exercise the principle of self-determination against occupying
or colonial forces within the meaning of Article 1(4) of Protocol I.
It might, however, be argued that the conflict between the coalition forces and
Al Qaeda should be subsumed into the conflict between the coalition and the Af-
ghan (Taliban) government. Such an argument can be made on the basis that Al
Qaeda could be regarded as 'other militias and members of other volunteer corps
... belonging to a Party to the conflict', namely Afghanistan, within the meaning of
Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, although the mere act of fighting in
concert is not sufficient to meet the test of 'belonging'.13 The remaining questions
would be whether such belligerents are considered as 'belonging to a Party to the
conflict' and if so, whether they acted in observance of the four established condi-
tions under this provision, which are constitutive of the status of POWs.
2.2.3 Armed conflict between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban
government
There existed an internal armed conflict fought between the Northern Alliance and
the Taliban government. The Afghan Northern Alliance was the loosely formed
anti-Taliban forces made up of disparate ethnic and religious groups (though
mainly non-Pashtun ethnic groups), which was united for the sole aim of toppling
the Taliban government. The Northern Alliance can be considered insurgents fight-
ing against the Taliban government.
This conflict was prima facie an internal armed conflict. It is, however, arguable
that this conflict can be classified as an 'internationalised non-international armed
conflict',14 in view of the close link between the Northern Alliance and the coali-
tion member states (in particular, the United States). Internationalised non-interna-
tional armed conflicts, which have occurred with intense frequency since 1945,
12. For examinations of non-international armed conflicts, see G. Abi-Saab, 'Non-International
Armed Conflict' in UNESCO, ed., International Dimensions of International Humanitarian Law
(Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff7Geneva, Henry Dunant Institute/Paris, UNESCO 1988) pp. 217, at p.
222; R.K. Goldman, 'International Humanitarian Law: Americas Watch's Experience in Monitoring
Internal Armed Conflicts', 9 Amer. Univ. JIL & Pol. (1993) p. 49; T. Meron, 'Towards a Humanitarian
Declaration of Internal Strife', 78 AJIL (1984) p. 859; T. Meron, 'Application of Humanitarian Law in
Noninternational Armed Conflicts', 85 American Society of International Law Proceedings (1991) p.
83; T. Meron, 'International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities', 89 AJIL (1995) p. 554; and T.
Meron and Allan Rosas, 'A Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards', 85 AJIL (1991) p.
375.
13. Rowe, loc. cit. n. 4, p. 301.
14. See D. Schindler, 'The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conven-
tions and Protocols', (1979-11) Receuildes Cours 121, at p. 150. For examination in specific context,
see B. Akinrinade, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone', 15 Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy (2001) p. 392; H.-P. Gasser, 'Internationalized Non-Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon', 33 Amer. Univ. LR
(1983) p. 145.
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remain mired in confusion with respect to the applicable humanitarian rules.
Where foreign troops intervene on behalf of a government fighting against rebels
that are regarded as falling outside the oppressed people exercising self-determina-
tion in the sense of Article 1(4) of Protocol I, such intervention is governed by
humanitarian rules on internal armed conflict, as it does not engender an armed
conflict between two states.15 On the other hand, where a foreign state intervenes
in aid of rebels against a government, it is clear that this will bring into forth the
whole array of rules on international humanitarian law. The artificial nature of the
dichotomy between international and internal armed conflicts, however, has be-
come increasingly contested in view of the growing recognition of human rights
law. In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) acknowledged that '[i]f international law, while
of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn
to the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the ... dichotomy should
gradually lose its weight.'16 Moir observes that the convergence of the two bodies
of law (with respect to international and internal armed conflict) will eventually
reach the stage where the focus of examinations should turn to the threshold ques-
tion relating to whether or not there exists an armed conflict.n
Since Afghanistan is not a party to Additional Protocol II, the fighting between
the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan is characterised as internal
armed conflict, the humanitarian rules applicable to such conflict are, strictly
speaking, limited to common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and customary
rules. However, an argument might be made that the degree of control exercised by
the United States over the conduct of the Northern Alliance was sufficiently close
to impute the conduct of this anti-Taliban insurgent to the responsibility of the
United States. According to this reasoning, the responsibility for the killing of a
number of Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners subsequent to the uprising at Qala-e
Jhangi Fort near Mazar-e Sharif between 25 November and 1 December 2001,18 as
well as other incidents of grave concern,19 might be attributed to the coalition
states.
It might further be surmised that the satisfaction of the attribution test under the
rubric of state responsibility would transform what is prima facie an internal armed
15. L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002) at
pp. 50-51. In relation to the Soviet intervention, obstensibly on the side of the Afghan government
against Mujahidin groups, until its withdrawal in 1989, the ICRC described the conflict as internal: H.
McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law (Aldershot, Dartmouth 1990) p. 175.
16. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (Appeal on Jurisdiction), 35 ILM (1996) p. 32,
para. 97.
17. Moir, op. cit. n. 15, at pp. 51-52.
18. A. Roberts, 'Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War', 44 Survival (2002) pp. 7 at
pp. 20-21.
19. There were numerous reports of dozens of Taliban fighters being asphyxiated in shipping con-
tainers transporting them to prison in Shibarghan, a northern city near Mazar-e-Sharif, after their sur-
render to the Northern Alliance. Reports also refer to beatings of the detainees in order to extract
confession; C. Gall, 'A Nation challenged: Prisoners; Witnesses Say Many Taliban Died in Custody',
The New York Times (11 December 2001) Section A, p. 1; and R. Caroll, 'Afghan jailers beat confes-
sions from men', The Guardian (28 December 2001) p. 13.
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conflict into an international one. The armed conflict between the Northern Alli-
ance and the Taliban government till the latter was overthrown may be described
as an 'internationalised non-international armed conflict', on the ground that the
military operation of the Northern Alliance was closely supervised and even con-
trolled by the United States. The statement made by Donald Rumsfeld, the US
Defense Secretary, that the US enjoyed a 'relationship with all of those elements
on the ground', in view of supply of food, ammunitions and of assistance with
overhead targeting,20 might indicate that the US exercised a degree of control ran-
ging between an overall control and an effective control over conduct of the North-
ern Alliance. There was close military coordination between the coalition and the
Northern Alliance, so that the coalition's air campaign was directed against speci-
fic Taliban strongholds on the'ground at the request of the Northern Alliance.
Without the coalition's effective contribution, it would be unimaginable that this
anti-Taliban insurgent that exercised control only over one tenth of the territory at
the inception could so swiftly advance and eject the Taliban government.21
Applying the test of 'effective control' that the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) established in the Nicaragua case with respect to the assessment of state
responsibility,22 the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, in the Tadic case, ruled that the
degree of authority wielded by a state over armed forces fighting on its behalf,
which is sufficient to invite the application of international humanitarian law, must
be 'effective control'. However, rejecting the view of the Trial Chamber, the Ap-
peals Chamber held that the degree of control exerted over armed forces fighting
against the same adversary must be set at a lower level of 'overall control'.23 The
degree of control is not so strong as to require specific orders to be issued for each
military action,24 but it must go beyond the mere coordination and cooperation
between allies in political and military activities.25 The Appeals Chamber ex-
pressed a caveat that where the controlling state in question was not an adjacent
state with territorial ambitions with respect to the territories where the conflict oc-
curred, the standard of evidence would be set at a high level. It added that 'more
extensive and compelling evidence' revealing not merely the act of financing and
equipping but also that of generally directing or helping plan, must be adduced to
demonstrate that the conflict became internationalised.26 Doubt may remain as to
whether the test employed to examine the question of state responsibility can be
20. Rumsfeld, Press Briefing with General Pace, 30 November 2001, <http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Nov2001/briefings.html>.
21. See Cryer, loc. cit. n. 4, at pp. 44-47 and the BBC sources cited in n. 48.
22. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara-
gua v. USA), (1986) ICJ 14, at pp. 62, 64-65, paras. 109 and 115 (27 June 1986).
23. Case IT-94-I, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of 15 July 1999, paras. 145, 146 and 162. See also
Cyprus v. Turkey, where the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey's state responsibility
under the European Convention on Human Rights could arise, with her 'effective overall control' over
northern Cyprus suggesting her 'acquiescence or connivance' in acts of private individuals violating
others' rights: Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment of 10 May 2001, paras. 77 and 81.
24. Ibid., para. 145.
25. Ibid., para. 152.
26. Ibid., para. 138.
Legal questions concerning Afghanistan 69
imported to the issue of identifying the international armed conflict as defined in
common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions.27 The Appeals Chamber's approach
is even more puzzling, in that the conditions under which irregulars such as orga-
nised resistance groups are regarded as 'belonging' to a party to the conflict within
the meaning of common Articles 13(2)/13(2)/4A(2) of the 1949 First, Second and
Third Geneva Conventions were mixed up with the conditions for the internationa-
lisation of an internal armed conflict.28
In the context of Afghanistan, it may not be sustainable to argue that on the basis
of the rationale used by the Appeals Chamber, the degree of control exercised by
the coalition over the conduct of the Northern Alliance reached the overall control
sufficient to internationalise the armed conflict between the latter and the Taliban.
Considerable doubt remains concerning whether the stringent standard of evidence
required for 'overall control' exercised by an external power other than a neigh-
bouring state was met in the Afghan context. In that sense, as Cryer notes,29 the
Northern Alliance may not be considered to 'belong' to the coalition forces in the
sense of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, so that the violations of jus in
bello by the Northern Alliance would not give rise to the responsibility of the
coalition states. This construction can leave open the possibility that the armed
conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance was non-international.
2.3 The nature of hostilities after 5 December 2001
2.3.1 The armed conflict between the Afghan government forces and the US-
led coalition forces on one hand, and the anti-governmental insurgents
on the other in the Post-Bonn Process
Since 11 August 2003, more than 12,000 US troops in Afghanistan, together with
troops from NATO member states, have been fighting as part of the ongoing En-
during Freedom operation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants. These are
in addition to about 5,500 ISAF soldiers stationed in and around Kabul.30 The
resurgence of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda groups, in loose collaboration with
supporters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former prime minister, and regular armed
attacks against US and Afghan governmental forces as well as some against aid
workers, reveal the tenacious nature of the insurrectional forces and the remote
prospect of the end of the hostilities in Afghanistan.31 While NATO has assumed
27. J. Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility - Introduc-
tion, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002) at p. 112. See also the
separate opinion of Judge Shahabudeen, Case IT-94-1, Prosecutors. Tadic, paras. 145-146, 162.
28. R. Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2002) at p. 92.
29. Cryer, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 47.
30. See 'Afghan in trouble', The Financial Times, Editorial (6 June 2003) p. 20; P. Reeves, 'Af-
ghan battle ends with death of 40 guerrillas', The Independent (6 June 2003) p. 13; and J. Dempsey, B.
Benoit and G. Wiesmann, 'Nato expects to come under pressure to patrol outside Kabul', The Finan-
cial Times (11 August 2003) p. 6.
31. See E. MacAskill, 'Extra troops must fill vacuum beyond Kabul to quell warlords, warns
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command of ISAF since 11 August 2003,32 the US and British coalition forces
have established 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams' (PRTs) as a backdoor effort to
introduce an international military and civilian presence in remote areas where
governmental control is weak.33
Since the coming into existence of the Interim Afghan government led by Ha-
mid Karzai, the Taliban forces have been transformed into armed rebels or even
insurgents, to which Al Qaeda remnants are thinly aligned. The fighting between
the nascent governmental forces and the anti-government insurgents consisting of
the Taliban and Al Qaeda remainders as well as of Mujahidin militants goes be-
yond the threshold of internal disturbances and tensions and it can be classified as
internal armed conflict.34 Moreover, the ongoing armed hostilities between the US-
led coalition forces and the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces can be subsumed into the
non-international armed conflict, since the involvement of the US troops is based
on the express consent and invitation of the Kabul government. All the humanitar-
ian rules germane to civil wars, namely, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions and customary rules, bind all the parties to this type of conflict. While both
Afghanistan and the United States are not parties to Additional Protocol II, query is
needed as to customary law status of many rules embodied in this Protocol.
With respect to customary law applicable to internal armed conflict, not only the
government but also insurgent troops are bound by customary law relating to inter-
nal strife. In its 1999 Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Columbia,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated that humanitarian law is
binding on paramilitary groups.35 In the Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY went so far as to suggest that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (relating to
violations of the laws or customs of war) encompasses all (serious) violations of
international humanitarian law (both Geneva and Hague rules, except for grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions (as prescribed by Art. 2 of the Statute), geno-
cide (Art. 4) and crimes against humanity (Art. 5)).36 Concurring with Aldrich,37
Meron criticises the Appeals Chamber's approach as over-inclusive, entailing the
implication that both Hague law and the provisions of the Geneva Conventions
(bar provisions on grave breaches) apply to both international and non-interna-
Musharraf, The Guardian (19 June 2003) p. 15; 'Kandahar berates Straw for a leftover life of gun law
and broken promises', ibid. (2 July 2003) p. 13 and V. Burnett, 'UN forced to halt aid work in south-
ern Afghanistan', The Financial Times (11 August 2003) p. 6.
32. Demsey et al., loc. cit. n. 30.
33. Reeves, loc. cit. n. 30; Burnett, loc. cit. n. 31. Since 6 January 2004, the German-led Kunduz
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) has been officially transferred from Coalition Forces Com-
mand to the ISAF.
34. Art. 1 (2) of Additional Protocol II sets the minimum threshold of its applicability, providing
that it 'shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts'.
35. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9 rev. 1, 26 February 1999, para. 13, available at <http://
www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colom99en/table%20of%20contents.htm>.
36. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, rep-
rinted in 35 ILM(\996) p. 32 at pp. 49-50, 71, paras. 87-88, 137.
37. G.H. Aldrich, 'Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia',
90 AJIL (1996) pp. 64 at 67-68.
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tional armed conflicts.38 In other words, the implication is that there are rules of
customary humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflict, the basis of
which lies outside the framework of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions, Protocol II and Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Prop-
erty.39
It might be questioned whether subsequent to the establishment of the Karzai
government, the Taliban remnants, in collaboration with other anti-governmental
militants and Al Qaeda can be regarded as 'peoples' fighting against an occupying
power. For all the near universal antipathy toward the Taliban theocracy for its
gross violations of human rights, especially those of women, such an argument
cannot be brushed aside. It is not to belittle the Taliban's oppressive nature to hy-
pothesise a scenario of unlawful occupation from a juridical perspective. Indeed,
the situation in Afghanistan might be compared to the circumstances in Cambodia
after the Vietnamese invasion, which ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979. The con-
tinued fighting in Cambodia between the Vietnamese forces on one hand and the
Khmer Rouge and other Khmer forces on the other did not cease even after the
instalment of the Vietnamese-backed 'puppet regime' (the Hen Samrin govern-
ment). It is possible to consider that the hostilities between the Vietnamese forces
and the troops of the Khmer Rouge after the establishment of the Hen Samrin
government were governed by the law of international armed conflicts, with the
hostilities perceived as an extension of the conflict between the Vietnamese forces
in alliance with the coalition of insurgents, the United Front (which later formed
the Hen Samrin government) and the Khmer Rouge forces.40
The armed hostilities in Afghanistan between the US-led coalition forces and the
anti-governmental forces might be regarded as a prolongation of the initial phase
of the war, namely the international armed conflict between the coalition forces
and the former Taliban government. This hypothesis is based on the assumptions
that the Karzai government has been installed by the occupying power, namely, the
US-led coalition forces, and that the government set up by the occupying power is
debarred from obtaining a license for 'friendly presence' of its troops, by entering
into an agreement between them. Such assumptions would mean that the relation
between the US-led forces and the Afghan civilian population has been covered,
uninterruptedly since 6/7 October 2001 onward, by rules on belligerent occupation
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, so that the civilian population must not be
deprived of 'the benefits from the present Convention by any change introduced
... into the institutions or government' of the territory concerned.41 A twist of this
hypothesis would be to view the Taliban-led coalition as fighting against an 'alien
occupation' within the meaning of Article 1(4) of Protocol I,42 albeit that state
38. Meron, loc. cit. n. 10, at p. 243.
39. Moir, op. cit. n. 15, at pp. 188-189
40. Gasser, loc. cit. n. 14, at p. 154.
41. Art. 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949.
42. A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples - A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press 1995) pp. 201-204.
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practice has so far proved insufficient to warrant the argument that this provision
has ripened into a customary international norm.43
However, the fundamental pitfall of drawing an analogy from the Cambodian
case to the Afghan context is that, unlike the Hen Samrin government which did
not receive the UN's recognition for geopolitical reasons, the Bonn process, and
hence the Afghan Interim Authority led by Hamid Karzai, have been expressly
endorsed by a series of Security Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII.44
Security Council Resolution 1378, although not adopted under Chapter VII, even
called on the Afghan people to exercise the right of self-determination to over-
throw the Taliban regime. Surely, it may be argued that as a non-binding resolu-
tion, Resolution 1378 cannot be seen to yield 'constitutive' effects of
delegitimizing the then Taliban government. However, there has been both in state
practice and opinio juris a universal recognition that the Karzai government, which
has the effective control over most of the Afghan territory and population, is the
sole legitimate government representative of the Afghan people.45
2.3.2 'Armed conflict' between the International Security Assistance Force
and the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants
The International Security Assistance Force46 is a peacekeeping force established
under the Security Council's Chapter VII Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001.47
Its main objective is to assist the Afghan Interim Authority to maintain national
security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, facilitate UN personnel to work in a
secure environment and ensure that the war-torn society can initiate the process of
national reconstruction.48 The prospect of expanding peacekeepers to other cities
depends on the outcome of the continued US military campaign against the Taliban
and Al Qaeda remnants. Where ISAF troops exchange fire with the resurgent Tali-
ban or Al Qaeda soldiers, or with any other warring factions, can such 'hostilities'
be regarded as an 'armed conflict' susceptible to normative constraints of jus in
bellol
ISAF is a multinational force under the unified command of the troop-contribut-
ing states that signed the joint Memorandum of Understanding in London on 10
January 2002.49 As such, it is not under the UN Force Commander. It was initially
43. Ibid, at pp. 203-204.
44. See, inter alia, Resolution 1387,20 December 2001, S/RES/1386 (2001); Resolution 1413, 23
May 2002, S/RES/1413 (2002); and Resolution 1444, 27 November 2002, S/RES/1444 (2002).
45. For discussions on the recognition of governments, see Tinoco Concessions Arbitration (Great
Britain v. Costa Rica), (1923) 1 R1AA 369; and S. Talmon, Recognition of Governments in Interna-
tional Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1998).
46. So far, 18 mainly western countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, France, Italy, Germany and Britain) have provided troops.
47. See also additional authorization derived from Security Council Resolution 1413, 23 May
2002, S/RES/1413 (2002); and Resolution 1444, 27 November 2002, S/RES/1444 (2002).
48. Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001, operative para. 1.
49. The Memorandum, which was signed by Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
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under the British unified command for six months, followed by the command ex-
ercised by other troop-contributing states (Turkey and Germany/the Netherlands),
and since August 2003 was handed over to NATO. Nevertheless, ISAF's mandate
has been specifically provided by binding Chapter VII resolution, and it works
closely with the United Nations and the Afghan interim government. The norma-
tive framework for its use of force follows the models of the multilateral forces
against Iraq50 and the involvement of the NATO member states in Yugoslavia51
and UNITAF in Somalia.52 In all these cases, the Security Council, with its re-
newed assertiveness after the end of the Cold War, has granted member states an
express authorization to use force. Such a form of delegation of the Security Coun-
cil's enforcement function to member states has been seen in Rwanda,53 Haiti,54
Albania,55 the Central African Republic,56 Kosovo,57 East Timor58 and Congo.59
The question as to whether, and if so what part of, humanitarian law applies to
the conduct of UN and other multilateral forces acting pursuant to enforcement
action of the Security Council is not only of academic but also practical impor-
tance.60 Multinational forces can form part of the enforcement action pursuant to
the Security Council's Chapter VII resolutions, or act as a humanitarian mission61
based on non-binding Security Council resolutions outside the framework of
Italy, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK,
formally initiated Operation Fingal: available at <http://www.operations.mod.uk/fingal/index.htm>.
50. See Security Council Resolution 678, 29 November 1990, S/RES/678 (1990).
51. The first such authorization was granted by Resolution 770 (1992).
52. For examinations of multinational forces, see Gray, op. cit. n. 66, at p. 187.
53. Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994, S/RES/929 (1994).
54. Resolution 940 of 31 July 1994, S/RES/940 (1994).
55. Resolution 1101 of 28 March 1997, S/RES/1101, operative para. 4 (compare reference to multi-
national forces for non-enforcement purposes under operative para. 2).
56. Resolution 1125 authorized member states, which contributed to the MISAB, the Inter-African
Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements, (established in January 1997) to
use force for secure the security of their personnel: Resolution 1125 of 6 August 1997, S/RES/1125
(1997).
57. Resolution 1244 was passed under Chapter VII, authorizing member states and relevant inter-
national organisations to create KFOR, to which NATO contributed.
58. Resolution 1264, adopted under Chapter VII, authorised the creation of a multinational force
under a unified command structure assumed by Australia, INTERFET.
59. See the deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia, Congo in
close coordination with the UN peacekeeping force, the MONUC: Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003,
S/RES/1484 (2003), operative, para. 1.
60. L. Doswald-Beck, 'Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Future Wars', in M.
N. Schmitt and L.C. Green, eds., The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millennium 71 US Naval
War College International Law Studies (1998) pp. 39 at pp. 59-62; R.D. Glick, 'Lip Service to the
Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and United Nations Armed Forces', 17 Michigan JIL (1995) p. 53;
C. Greenwood, 'Protection of Peacekeepers: the Legal Regime', 7 DukeJCIL (1996) p. 185; P. Rowe,
'Maintaining Discipline in United Nations Peace Support Operations: the Legal Quagmire for Military
Contingents', 5 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2000) p. 45; and B.D. Tittemore, 'Belligerents
in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace Operations', 33
Stanford JIL (\997) p. 61.
61. Doswald-Beck, ibid., at p. 60.
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Chapter VII.62 With respect to multilateral forces under the Chapter VII mandate,
existing humanitarian law treaties do not recognise such forces as a party to the
armed conflict. As compared with UN peacekeeping forces,63 which are expected
to be neutral forces rather than adversarial 'parties to a conflict',64 there should be
no obstacle to the idea of the multinational forces as a whole being recognised as a
belligerent. In the context of UN peacekeeping forces, the UN model agreement
between the United Nations and troop-contributing countries (TCCs) includes only
a general reference to compliance with the laws of war.65 The Brahimi Report66 is
confined to such general compliance with humanitarian law67 and the recommen-
dation to secure a clear chain of command for UN peacekeeping forces.68
A temporary solution to the lack of humanitarian law applicable to multinational
forces as a whole is to surmise that each national contingent is bound by humani-
tarian treaties that its flag state has ratified. This means that there would be an
ineluctable difference in the humanitarian laws applicable to national troops con-
tributing to the ISAF. The fact that not all participating states are parties to specific
humanitarian treaties gives rise to problems of 'interoperability'. Such problems
can arise in relation both to a regional organisation such as NATO and the Organi-
sation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to ad hoc multilateral
forces, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia in 1990.69 In order to fill such legal
loopholes, amending existing humanitarian law treaties or supplementing them
through a protocol would be essential. With specific regard to the Afghan situation
of armed hostilities between the anti-governmental rebels and the ISAF acting in
self-defence, it is possible to foresee a scenario in which the ISAF's action exceeds
the remit of self-defence by getting actively involved in the fight against the rebels.
Such likelihood reinforces the argument that the ISAF as a whole should be bound
by the humanitarian rules based on common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions and
customary norms applicable to internal armed conflicts.
62. See for instance, Resolution 1101 of 28 March 1997, which relates to Albania: S/RES/1101
(1997), operative para. 2.
63. See Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International Huma-
nitarian Law, 38 ILM (\999) p. 1656.
64. Doswald-Beck, loc. cit. n. 60, at pp. 59-60; and Tittemore, loc. cit. n. 60, at p. 80.
65. Doswald-Beck, loc. cit. n. 60, at p. 60.
66. The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations of 21 August 2000 (The Brahimi Report), A/
55/305, S/2000/809, available at <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peaceoperations/>; 39 ILM
(2000) p. 1432. For the commentary on the report, see C. Gray, 'Peacekeeping after the Brahimi
Report: is there a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?', 6 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2001)
pp. 267 at 281; and N. White, 'Commentary on the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (The
Brahimi Report)', 6 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2001) p. 127.
67. A/55/305, S/2000/809, p. 17, para. 6.
68. Ibid., p. 61, para. 267.
69. Doswald-Beck , loc. cit. n. 60, at p. 60.
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3. CRITERIA FOR COMBATANTS UNDER HUMANITARIAN LAW
Having examined the nature of armed conflicts in Afghanistan and determined the
applicable laws in each facet of the war, the next section explores the criteria for
'lawful combatants' under the 1949 Third Geneva Convention and 1977 Addi-
tional Protocol I. The analysis of Additional Protocol I is necessary to the extent
that part of it may be considered as having attained the status of customary interna-
tional law applicable to both parties. There is also brief appraisal of laws governing
internal armed conflict, such as common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, Additional Protocol II, as well as customary rules.
3.1 Criteria for combatants under Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention
3.1.1 General overview
The first two paragraphs of Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention stipulate
that:
'Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one
of the following categories, who have fallen into the Power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias
or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.'
Article 4A(2) of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention reaffirms the four conditions
laid down in Article 1 of the Hague Regulations,70 subject to a minor linguistic
change in the second condition concerning the distinct sign, such as uniform or
outfit. The only marked change is that, in response to the crucial contribution made
by organised resistance movements in Axis-occupied territories in Europe, it was
felt necessary to extend, under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, the
scope of combatants to cover organised resistance movements in occupied terri-
tories. The four criteria set out in Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention
need to be cumulatively met. It is generally accepted that though the stringency
70. See also Arts. 1 and 2 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
1929, available at <http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf7>.
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with which to interpret each of the criteria may vary, these criteria are 'constitutive'
in nature for the purpose of claiming the qualification of POW status on the part of
independent forces.71
3.1.2 The four defined conditions
3.1.2.1 Being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates
With respect to the first condition, such a responsible leader may be civilian or
military. This condition suggests the existence of an organisational structure that
enforces discipline, with its essence being to provide 'reasonable assurance' that
the other three conditions will be observed.72
3.1.2.2 Wearing of fixed distinctive signs
As regards the second condition, its main objective is two-fold: to protect the
members of the armed forces of the occupying power by avoiding treacherous
attacks; and to safeguard non-combatant civilians from adverse effects of war by
preventing a perpetrator of a belligerent act from escaping into the general popula-
tion.73 The question of the types of 'fixed distinctive sign' remained unresolved
when the identical terms were used in the two Hague Conventions and in the 1929
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention.74 The ICRC's Commentary on the Third
Geneva Convention explains that a variety of signs other than an arm-band can be
used by partisans, including a cap, a coat, a shirt, an emblem or a coloured sign
worn on the chest.75 Another aspect of controversy concerns the interpretation of
the phrase, 'recognizable at a distance'. Oppenheim/Lauterpacht proposed a more
stringent requirement for a member of a resistance group than for members of the
regular armed forces, stating that 'it is reasonable to expect that the silhouette of an
irregular combatant standing against the skyline should be at once distinguishable
from that of a peaceful inhabitant by the naked eye of ordinary individuals, at a
distance at which the form of an individual can be determined'.76 However, such a
proposal does not seem compatible with the ensuing humanitarian trend to approx-
imate resistance groups to the status of regular armed forces. The ICRC's position
has been that the visibility of the 'distinctive sign' should be treated in a manner
analogous to a uniform.77
71. H.S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict Vol. 59 (Newport RI, US Naval
War College International Law Studies 1978) at p. 53.
72. J.S. Pictet, ed., Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (hereinafter Commentary, GCIII) (Geneva, ICRC 1960) p. 59.
73. Levie, op. cit. n. 71, at pp. 46-47.
74. Ibid., at p. 47.
75. Commentary, GCIII, op. cit. n. 72, at p. 60.
76. L. Oppenheim, International Law, 7th edn., H. Lauterpacht, ed. Vol. II, (London, Longman
1952) p. 257, fh. 2. See also Military Prosecutor v. Kassem (1971) 42 ILR, at p. 478.
77. Levie, op. cit. n. 71, at p. 48. See also Commentary, GCIII, op. cit. n. 72, at p. 60.
Legal questions concerning Afghanistan 77
3.1.2.3 Open carrying of arms
In relation to the third condition, the 'open' carrying of arms, this does not require
'visibility', so that a hand-grenade or a revolver can be placed in a pocket or under
a coat.78 However, a soldier concealing a sidearm or hand-grenade or dagger in the
clothing is not held to this requirement.79
3.1.2.4 Compliance with the laws and customs of war
Among the four defined conditions, the fourth condition leaves many questions
unanswered. It seems indisputable that in order to avail themselves of the entitle-
ment to POW status, the irregular forces must ensure that their members comply
with the laws and customs of war. The ICRC's Commentary is confined to the
general statement that partisans are obliged to observe the Geneva Conventions
'to the fullest extent possible'.80 It is not required that combatants both as a group
and individually strictly observe all details of humanitarian law provisions81 What
remains unclear is whether this requirement is a constitutive condition for POW
status or a general obligation for all combatants.82 Rosas argues that the fourth
condition of Article 4A(2) should be treated as a constitutive condition both for
combatants and POWs in respect of independent forces.83
Moreover, it is contested whether this condition should be regarded as an indivi-
dual or group requirement. While the question as to an individual or collective
requirement can also arise in respect of the second requirement of wearing fixed
distinctive signs and the third requirement of carrying arms openly, it has become
the focus of examinations with regard to the requirement of observing jus in bello.
Can an individual belligerent's scrupulous observance of the laws and customs of
war reward him/her the POW status even if the group as a whole to which s/he
belongs has openly disregarded such laws and customs? It is reasonable to argue,
on the basis of the collective criterion, that where the great majority of an orga-
nised resistance movement comply with the laws and customs of war as a matter
of official policy, this would satisfy the fourth condition, notwithstanding indivi-
dual cases of violations and even of war crimes.84 There is an implicit recognition
under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention that if non-fulfilment by
78. Commentary, GCIII, ibid., at p. 61.
79. Oppenheim, op. cit. n. 76 at p. 257, n. 3; Levie, op. cit. n. 71, at p. 50. See also Military
Prosecutor v. Kassem, supra n. 76, at pp. 478-79.
80. Commentary, GCIII, op. cit. n. 72, at p. 61.
81. A. Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War — A Study in International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia 1976) at pp. 362-363.
82. Ibid., at pp. 359-375.
83. Ibid., at pp. 363.
84. Levie, op. cit. n. 71, at p. 52; and G.L. Neuman, 'Humanitarian Law and Counterterrorist
Force', 14 EJIL (2003) pp. 283 at p. 294. See US Department of the Army, The US Army Field
Manual 27-10, the Law of Land Warfare (1956), <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>, para. 64(d), which
reads that '[t]his condition is fulfilled if most of the members of the body observe the laws and cus-
toms of war, notwithstanding the fact that the individual member concerned may have committed a
war crime.'
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members of the resistance movement is incidental, there is no collective violation
that would deny the whole group the entitlement to POW status.85 Yet the assertion
may be made that since the observance of all the four conditions should be re-
garded as constitutive in nature, the converse is not the case, so that gross and
systematic non-compliance by the organised resistance movement with most (as
opposed to detailed) rules of humanitarian law deprives any of its members of
POW status.86 As will be explained below, however, the rule embodied in Article
44(2) of Protocol I, which accords the right to be a prisoner of war even to an
individual soldier who has not honoured jus in bello, can be considered as trans-
formed into customary law. There might be some scope to argue that while accept-
ing the parallel existence of two sources of law on the same subject,87 the
emergence of such a customary norm has strengthened (if not overstretched) the
normative effectiveness of Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, allow-
ing the meaning of this provision to be modified.88 This would mean that while this
provision is premised on a collective assumption, the systematic policy of a group
riding roughshod over rules of humanitarian law should not detrimentally affect
the right to be a prisoner of war of an individual member who has conscientiously
observed such rules.
3.1.3 Applicability of the four conditions to Article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva
Convention
There are two schools of interpretation regarding whether the four criteria for eval-
uating lawful combatants as laid down under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva
Convention should apply to all categories of 'lawful combatants' enumerated in
Article 4A(1). The first view is to hold that, consistent with the textual meaning
and structural framework of Article 4A, only '[m]embers of other militias and
members of other volunteer corps' under the chapeau of Article 4A(2) have to
meet the four criteria set out in this paragraph. This means that members of the
regular armed forces and members of militias or volunteer corps incorporated into
the national army are ipso facto considered lawful combatants and, if captured,
entitled to the status of a prisoner of war, without the need to determine whether
their overall conduct has satisfied the four criteria laid down in the second para-
85. Rosas, op. cit. n. 81, at p. 337.
86. Levie, op. cit. n. 71, at pp. 52-53; and Rosas, ibid., at pp. 361 and 363. Neuman's position is
close to such view, though he emphasizes the need to examine the structure of the group and the
degree to which an individual member has participated in serious violations of humanitarian law: Neu-
man, op. cit. n. 84, at p. 294.
87. Case concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. US). Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Rep. (1986) pp. 14, at 94, para. 176.
88. The possibility that the normative content of a treaty provision changes through the concurrent
emergence of state practice and opinio juris, despite apparent contradiction with another treaty provi-
sion, is recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in Ocalan v. Turkey (the recognition that
capital punishment may be considered as 'inhuman and degrading treatment' in breach of Art. 3,
notwithstanding Art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights): Judgment of 12 March 2003,
para. 198.
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graph.89 Lawful combatants must not be punished for the fact of having taken part
in an armed conflict.
The second view considers that all participants in armed hostilities, including
members of regular armed forces, must satisfy the four conditions set forth in Arti-
cle 4A(2).90 According to this view, customary international law prior to 1949 al-
ways required members of regular forces to adhere to these four conditions.91 It can
be contended that the application of the four conditions to members of the regular
armed forces is implied in their definition under the Third Geneva Convention.92
With the four defined conditions deemed as constitutive, the failure to meet any of
them would justify the approach whereby the right to POW status, if not combatant
status, could be removed. The support for the second view can be found in national
jurisprudence. In Mohamed AH v. Public Prosecutor,93 the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council of the United Kingdom was asked in 1968 to adjudicate on the
question whether the defendants belonging to the Indonesian Army, who landed in
Singapore (then a part of Malaysia) and killed some civilians by explosives, could
claim POW status. A state of armed conflict existed between Indonesia and Malay-
sia. Though the case concerned the defendants wearing civilian clothes when they
set explosives, the Privy Council held that '[s]hould regular combatants fail to
comply with these four conditions, they may in certain cases become unprivileged
belligerents ... mean [ing] that they would not be entitled to the status of prisoners
of war upon their capture.'94
The ICRC's Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention states that there was
an overall agreement at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference that it was superfluous to
expressly lay down the four criteria, as mentioned under Article 4A(2), for mem-
bers of regular armed forces under Article 4A(1).93 While the Commentary sug-
89. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 894 and Matheson, loc. cit. n. 5, at p. 355. Rowe seems to follow
this reasoning, stating that since the Taliban fighters belonged to the armed forces of a party to the
conflict, i.e., Afghanistan, they 'are likely to be prisoners of war', without referring to the four condi-
tions under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention: Rowe, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 317.
90. See for instance, Y. Dinstein, 'The Distinction Between Unlawful Combatants and War Crim-
inals', in Y. Dinstein, ed., International Law at a Time of Perplexity - Essays in Honour ofShabtai
Rosenne (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1989) pp. 103 at p. 105; H. Fischer, 'Protection of Prisoners of War', in
D. Fleck, ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (Oxford, Oxford University
Press 1995) Ch. 7, at p. 335 (the requirement of carrying arms openly as a 'constitutive element' both
of combatant and of prisoners of war status); Levie, op. cit. n. 71, at pp. 36-37; W. T. Mallison and S.
V. Mallison, 'The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants Under the International Humanitarian Law
of Armed Conflict', 9 Case Western Reserve JIL (1977) pp. 39, at 44-45, 48, and 61-62; and Wedg-
wood, loc. cit. n. 5, at p. 335.
91. For instance, Art. 3 of the Oxford Manual provides that '[e]very belligerent aimed force is
bound to conform to the laws of war.'
92. S.R. Ratner, 'Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello after September 11', 96 AJIL (2002) pp. 905, at p.
912.
93. 42ILR (1971) p. 458.
94. Ibid., at p. 466 (emphasis in the original). See also The Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud
Kassem and Others (Israeli Military Court, 1969), where the Israeli Military Court agreed that the four
conditions of Article 4A(2) must apply to regular forces as well, pp. 17, at 32. Law and Courts in the
Israel-Held Areas 42 ILR (1971) pp. 470 at p. 479.
95. The Commentary states that the expression 'members of regular armed forces' denotes that
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gests that the second strand of argument - that regular forces are also covered by
the four conditions —may take the upper hand, further dissection of the nature of
the conditions is needed. As suggested by Rosas' analysis,96 it is submitted that the
four defined conditions under Article 4A(2) are constitutive and collective condi-
tions only for independent forces. In contrast, the same cannot a priori be said with
respect to regular forces under Article 4A(1), and the four conditions can be re-
garded as declaratory and individual in respect of such forces.
3.2 Criteria for combatants under 1977 Additional Protocol I
3.2.1 General overview
Article 43(1) of Protocol I stipulates that:
'The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups
and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not re-
cognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disci-
plinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict.'
Article 43 no longer employs the terms, militia and volunteer corps. Article 43(1),
in contrast to Article 4A(1) of the Third Geneva Convention, makes it clear that all
the participants, including members of armed forces, are required to be subject to
some of the established conditions: they must be under a military command and
governed by an internal disciplinary system capable of enforcing compliance with
humanitarian rules. The second paragraph of Article 43 defines all the members of
the armed forces, bar medical personnel and chaplains, as combatants in the sense
that they have 'the right to participate directly in hostilities'.
The approach of Protocol I is to reconfirm the overlapping nature of the concept
of combatants and that of POWs, with Article 44(1) providing that '[a]ny comba-
tant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be
a prisoner of war'. Article 44(3) entails an innovative aspect, expanding the con-
cept of combatants to cover members of national liberation movements and guer-
rilla fighters, provided that they meet the even less stringent condition of
distinction than those laid down in Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention.
This provision was inserted in response to the growing demand of the socialist and
newly independent countries in Africa and Asia for upgrading the status of na-
tional liberation movements (NLM) and guerrilla movements in the decolonisation
such forces 'have all the material characteristics and all the attributes of armed forces', ...[based on the
conditions that] they wear uniform, they have an organized hierarchy and they know and respect the
laws and customs of war': Commentary, GCI1I, op. cit. n. 72, at 63. See also Mallison and Mallison,
loc. cit. n. 90, at p. 48.
96. Rosas, loc. cit. n. 81, at pp. 328, and 371-372. See also pp. 340-341, 348-349, 354, 358, 363
and 367.
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process and the Vietnam War. While the first sentence of Article 44(3) reiterates
the requirement that members of such groups must distinguish themselves from
civilians, the scope of application of this requirement becomes very narrowly de-
fined in the second sentence.97 The most widely accepted view among the dele-
gates at the 1974-77 Geneva Conference was that the requirement of distinction as
stipulated in Article 44(3) should equally apply to members of regular armed
forces organised in accordance with Article 43.98
3.2.2 The requirement of complying with the laws and customs of war
Article 44(2) of Additional Protocol I, which reiterates the fourth condition as laid
down under Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, is not intended to be a
prerequisite for combatant status, and even for POW status (unless otherwise pro-
vided in Article 44(3) and (4)). Article 44(2) makes it clear that the perpetration by
an individual of violations of laws of war, including war crimes, does not affect
his/her combatant and POW status. This does not have exculpatory effect on a
combatant who has perpetrated war crimes or other violations of laws and customs
of war, who remains punishable under national military law or international crim-
inal law. As will be discussed below in relation to detainees belonging to the Tali-
ban or Al Qaeda, there is ample scope for argument that the rule embodied in'
Article 44(2) of Protocol I can be considered as having attained the status of cus-
tom and that it is binding on non-contracting parties, such as the United States and
Afghanistan.
The ICRC's Commentary on Protocol I in respect of Article 44(2) makes it clear
that Protocol I has changed the previous rule derived from the Hague law and
Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. Article 44(2) adopts a uniform
approach to participants in hostilities, irrespective of whether members of regular
armed forces or those of independent forces (such as organised resistance move-
ments and national liberation movements).
With respect to the requirement of complying with laws and customs of war,
Article 44(2) retains a collective criterion, which is, however, accompanied by an
express guarantee that a violation of laws and customs of war by an individual
97. The second sentence of Art. 44(3) reads that: 'Recognizing, however, that there are situations in
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish
himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms
openly: (a) during each military engagement; and (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary
while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to
participate. Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as
perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph l(c).'
98. Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-1977), (hereinafter Official
Records), Vol. XV (Bern, Federal Political Department 1978) p. 157; and Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and
B. Zimmermann, eds., Commentary on the Protocol Additional of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) (hereinafter Commentary, Protocol I), (Geneva, iCRC/Martinus Nijhoff 1987) at p. 535,
para. 1719.
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combatant does not disqualify him/her for POW status." It may be argued that the
humanitarian objective underlying Article 44(2) supports the argument that even
systematic disregard for laws and customs of war by the group, whether regular
armed forces or national liberation movements, should not warrant the decision to
deprive an individual soldier abiding by such laws and customs of his/her POW
status. This means that only where an individual member has followed the general
policy of the group and systematically disregarded laws and customs of war, can
such an individual lose his/her right to POW status. That the ICRC has consistently
asserted that the legal status of each internee at Guantanamo Bay must be deter-
mined on an individual basis100 reinforces such progressive construction.
3.2.3 The requirement of carrying arms openly
The requirement of distinction is assessed on an individual basis, so that the failure
to carry arms openly when captured would deny a soldier the right to be POW,
despite the overall compliance with this requirement by a group as a whole.l01 The
remaining question is whether such a failure to distinguish from civilians would
lead to the deprivation of the right to be a combatant as well. The wording of
Article 44(4), which provides that a 'combatant' flouting the requirement of dis-
tinction as formulated under Article 44(3) is disabled from claiming only his/her
right to POW status, might suggest that the combatant status is retained. In con-
trast, the ICRC's Commentary on Protocol I102 and many other commentators'03
suggest that all the individuals captured while not meeting the requirement of car-
rying arms openly lose the right to a combatant as well and may be criminally
prosecuted for their participation in hostilities.104 The two views may not be set
apart in practical terms. Even if the first view is accepted, this does not exonerate
an individual from the offences based on the failure to distinguish him/herself from
civilians, leaving the possibility of trial and punishment pursuant to military law
and international criminal law. What is fundamentally at stake, as the representa-
tives of a national liberation movement insisted at the Geneva Conference, is the
recognition that a member of a national liberation movement, who face greater
difficulty in abiding by the requirement of distinction, should receive no less privi-
99. Commentary, Protocol I, ibid., at pp. 525-526, paras. 1689-1690. Many Socialist countries
attached reservations to Art. 85 to the effect that perpetrators of war crimes, when convicted, would
be deprived of the POW status.
100. See ICRC, 'Guantanamo Bay: the work continues', 9 May 2003, Operational update, avail-
able at <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/5C867ClD85AA2BE541256-
C94006000EE>.
101. Provost, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 37.
102. Commentary, Protocol I, op. cit. n. 98, at p. 538, para. 1719.
103. Dinstein, loc. cit. n. 90, at pp. 105 and 111 and Provost, op. cit. n. 28, at p. 37.
104. This was also the position of the United Kingdom delegation during the Working Group's
discussions at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference. According to the delegation, '[a]ny combatant
who violated the rules in paragraph 3 ... lost his combatant status and was therefore to be treated as a
person who did not have the right to engage in armed conflict even though he would be accorded
rights equivalent to those contained in the third Geneva Convention of 1949.' Official Records, op.
cit. n. 98, Vol. XV, p. 157, para. 14.
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lege and benefit as a POW than members of regular armed forces at the captor's
will.105
Protocol I introduces another innovative element of humanitarian considera-
tions, obliging the contracting parties to offer those captured while not meeting the
open arms requirement under the second sentence of Article 44(3) the 'protections
equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war' by the Third Gene-
va Convention and by Protocol I.'06 This protective status includes the due process
guarantees 'equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Conven-
tion in the case where such a person is tried and punished for any offences he has
committed'.107 Even those who fall outside POW status can be assured of a series
of specific minimum guarantees as laid down in Article 75 of Protocol I.
4. CONTROVERSIAL CATEGORIES OF BELLIGERENTS
4.1 'Unprivileged belligerents': general overview
The question arises as to the legal status of those participants in hostilities who are
not members of regular armed forces and who do not meet the necessary qualifica-
tions for lawful belligerents provided in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention
and Article 44 of Protocol I. Examples of such persons include spies, guerrillas,
partisans, saboteurs, mercenaries, 'war-traitors', francs-tireurs, terrorists and
others.108 The US military manuals interchangeably use the concepts, 'unlawful
combatants',109 'unprivileged belligerents'110 and 'illegal combatants',111 to refer to
such persons. While the terminology, 'unlawful combatant', does not entertain a
long lineage, there were some earlier equivalents, such as 'irregular combatants'
and 'marauders'.112
105. Official Records, ibid., Vol. VI, p. 148; and Commentary, Protocol I, supra n. 98, at p. 539, fh.
82.
106. Art. 44(4), first sentence.
107. Art. 44(4), second sentence.
108. R.R. Baxter, 'So-called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs', 28
BYIL (1951) p. 323. See also J. Klabbers, 'Rebel with a Cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law', 14
EJIL (2003) p. 299.
109. US Army, Operational Law Handbook (1997), JA 422, (Charlottesville, Virginia, Interna-
tional and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army, 1997),
<http://www.cdmha.org/toolkit/cdmha-rltk/PUBLICATIONS/oplaw-ja97.pdf>, p. 18-19.
110. US Army, Operational Law Handbook (2002), (Charlottesville, Virginia, International and
Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, US Army, 2002), <https://
www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.ns£/0/laf4860452r962-
c085256a490049856f?OpenDocument>, Ch. 2, p. 6.
111. US Navy, Commander's Handbook of the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, Department
of the Navy, 1995, available at <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/ILD/NWP%201-14M.htm>, para. 12.7.1.
112. Hoffman, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 228.
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When discussing spies, guerrillas and saboteurs, the concept of 'unprivileged
belligerents'113 should be preferred to the expression 'unlawful combatants'."4
Baxter has observed that
'armed and unarmed hostilities, wherever occurring [whether in occupied or unoccupied
areas], committed by persons other than those entitled to be treated as prisoners of war
or peaceful civilians merely deprive such individuals of a protection they might other-
wise enjoy under international law and place them virtually at the power of the en-
emy'.115
It may be argued that Baxter's view augured the progressive construction of huma-
nitarian law that characterised the Geneva Diplomatic Conference in 1977. Article
46 of Protocol I stipulates that those members of armed forces who are captured
while engaging in espionage are treated as spies and bereft of the right to be treated
as prisoners of war, without, however, alluding to the loss of the right to combatant
status.
Capital punishment for unprivileged belligerents is not excluded under the 1949
Geneva Conventions, except for those in occupied territories as prescribed in Arti-
cle 68 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, even those labelled as 'unpri-
vileged belligerents or combatants' are entitled to the minimum guarantees without
discrimination. Such minimum guarantees should correspond to the safeguards for
participants in civil conflicts, as provided in common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions.116 They are deemed as having been grafted onto customary law. More
detailed guarantees based on the rights to physical and mental integrity and due
process are enumerated in Article 75 of Protocol I, which in itself should be con-
sidered as customary international law.117
4.2 The right to partake in hostilities
With respect to whether unprivileged belligerents have the right to partake in hos-
tilities, two strands of argument can be presented. First, all such unprivileged belli-
gerents lack the right to engage in warfare with immunity from any liability under
national or international law.118 Members of such groups can be punished for their
113. Baxter, loc. cit. n. 108. See also J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflicts (London,
Stevens 1958) at p. 569.
114. Many jurists use the expression, 'unlawful combatants'. See, for instance, Dinstein, loc. cit. n.
90; and Knut Ipsen, 'Combatants and Non-Combatants', in Fleck, op. cit. n. 90, Ch. 3.
115. Baxter, loc. cit. n. 108, at p. 343.
116. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 893.
117. C.J. Greenwood, 'Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols', in A.J.M. Delissen
and G.J. Tanja, eds., Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of
Frits Kalshoven, (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 1991) pp. 93 at p. 103. The US government has also
considered Art. 75 as part of the customary rules embodied in Protocol I: US Army, Operational Law
Handbook (1997), op. cit. n. 109, p. 18-2; and US Army, Operational Law Handbook (2002), op. cit.
n. 110, Ch. 2, p. 5.
118. Dinstein, op. cit. n. 90, at p. 111.
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participation in hostilities and for any crimes, such as murder, assault, rape and
looting, that may have been committed in that connection, on the basis of national
law. Or, as in the event of a soldier who has killed an enemy soldier while wearing
the adversary's uniform, the basis for prosecution can be either a war crime in
international law (perfidy) or an ordinary crime in national law (murder).119 The
reasoning of the US Supreme Court in Exparte Quirin conforms to this argument.
In respect of German saboteurs who clandestinely landed in the United States, the
Court, distinguishing lawful and unlawful combatant, ruled that upon capture, '[u]
nlawful combatants... are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for
acts which render their belligerency unlawful'.120 Vulnerability of such persons to
criminal prosecution for the mere involvement in hostilities is the sanction to deter
their entry into armed conflicts.121
The second strand of argument is to deemphasise the distinction between the
members of belligerents whose act of participating in hostilities is lawful and those
whose such act itself should be deemed as unlawful. The thrust of the second argu-
ment is that susceptibility to punishment is not because their involvement in armed
conflicts is regarded as unlawful but due to the danger that they pose to adverse
parties. Baxter's seminal work in 1951 adopts this unitary approach, postulating
that all the categories of unprivileged belligerents are, while being vulnerable to
the forfeiture of their POW status and to punishment upon capture, not unlawful in
terms of their participation in hostilities.122 Such a unitary approach explains Bax-
ter's criticism that the finding of the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte
Quirin, that the saboteurs in question violated international law, was 'a fundamen-
tal confusion between acts punishable under international law and acts with respect
to which international law affords no protection'.123 The absence of legal protec-
tion prescribed by humanitarian law does not suggest that the act of participation in
hostilities is unlawful. The result of a captured soldier being classified as an unpri-
vileged belligerent is that s/he would be disentitled to POW status and subject to
119. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 893; Dinstein, ibid., and G.I.A.D. Draper, The Red Cross Conven-
tion, (London, Stevens 1958) at p. 52. See also US Army Field Manual, supra n. 84, para. 73, 'Persons
Committing Hostile Acts Not Entitled To Be Treated as Prisoners of War'.
120. Ex parte Quirin, 317 US 31.
121. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at pp. 893-894. Yet, Aldrich states that Al Qaeda personnel 'were com-
batants in hostilities and are not entitled to POW status', suggesting that they are at least entitled to the
right to be combatant: ibid., at p. 893.
122. Baxter argues that: 'Since these qualities [disregard for and deliberate non-observance of the
qualifications to be recognized as a prisoner of war] are those which most conspicuously inhere in
espionage, resistance activities in occupied areas, guerrilla warfare, and private hostilities in arms,
they afford grounds for believing that all these acts of warfare, whether or not involving the use of
arms and whether performed by military persons or by civilians, are governed by a single legal princi-
ple.' Baxter, loc. cit. n. 108, at p. 342. Baxter applies the same reasoning to simple evaders, escaped
prisoners of war captured or recaptured in civilian clothes, as well as military personnel captured while
wearing civilian clothes under their uniforms: ibid., at pp. 340-341.
123. Ibid., at p. 340. In another context, Baxter states that '[t]he judicial determination which is
necessary before a person may be treated as an unprivileged belligerent is ... not a determination of
guilt but of status only and, for the purposes of international law, it is sufficient to ascertain whether
the conduct of the individual has been such as to deny him the status of the prisoner or of the peaceful
civilian.' Ibid., at pp. 343-344.
86 Y. Arai-Takahashi
the same rights and disabilities as the civilian population, albeit his/her conduct is
considered relevant to assessment of penalty.124 Such an unprivileged belligerent,
who is not held either as a POW or as a peaceful civilian, can be tried under the
municipal law of the capturing state for a war crime stricti juris, as in the case of
killing of civilians, pillage or refusal to quarter.125 However, persons arrested and
captured in an occupied territory, as contrasted to those captured other than in an
occupied territory, will benefit from favourable treatment under Articles 64, 65, 67
and 68 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.126
The practice of the United States during the Vietnam War127 may be deemed as
harmonious with the second position. The US Military Command in Vietnam dur-
ing the Vietnam War adopted the policy of treating as POWs the captured members
of Viet Cong main and local force personnel, and Viet Cong irregulars, despite
considerable doubt as to whether members of these groups met the criteria set forth
in Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention.128 Members of the Viet Cong
were not granted POW status but treated as equal to POWs, on the condition that
when captured, they carried arms openly and engaged in combat or a belligerent
act, 'other than an act of terrorism, sabotage, or spying'.129 The US guidelines did
not require that a participant in armed hostilities wear a uniform.130 There was also
a possibility of an Article 5 tribunal to determine the status of those captured
whose status was in doubt.131
In relation to terrorists,132 Baxter's comprehensive approach is again instrumen-
tal in bringing a measure of legal discipline and cohesion into their classification
under humanitarian law. He discussed 'private hostilities in arms' on the equal
footing to spies and guerrillas in view of their 'disregard for the qualifications for
a prisoner of war status'. This, together with his argument that 'a single legal prin-
ciple' should apply to these categories, suggest that members of a transnational
terrorist organisation, such as Al Qaeda soldiers, be treated in the same vein as
other unprivileged belligerents.133 Baxter's unitary position can corroborate the lib-
124. Ibid, at p. 340.
125. Ibid, at p. 344.
126. Ibid. Art. 68 of the Fourth Geneva Convention forbids the application of capital punishment.
127. See Annex A, 'Criteria for Classification and Disposition of Detainees', part of Directive no.
381-46 of 27 December 1967; and Directive no. 20-5 of 15 March 1968, 'Inspections and Investiga-
tions: Prisoners of War - Determination of Eligibility'; both reprinted in C. Bevans, 'Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law', 62 AJIL (1968) pp. 754 at 765.
128. Gasser, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 567.
129. Bevans, loc. cit. n. 127, at p. 767.
130. Gasser, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 567.
131. Those found outside the status of lawful combatants and POWs were to be transferred to the
South Vietnamese authorities. Ibid.
132. While acknowledging the obsolete nature of the term, 'belligerency', Hoffman describes ter-
rorists as 'unlawful belligerents', who do not entertain the right to partake in armed hostilities, but
perpetrate indiscriminate attack in peacetime (for certain political goals). The 'unlawful belligerents'
would be distinguished from 'unlawful combatants', such as saboteurs, guerrillas and spies, who have
such a license and direct attack normally against lawful military objectives, though by deceptive or
treacherous means and methods: Hoffman, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 229.
133. Baxter, loc. cit. n. 108, at pp. 342-343.
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eral construction, based on the humanitarian object and purpose of the Geneva
Conventions, that all those participating in armed conflicts should be described as
'combatants' andprima facie deemed as entitled to a POW status till their status is
determined by a competent tribunal. The underlying rationale of this argument is
that the question of their right to be considered as combatants in modern warfare
has lost importance, with the focus of examination having shifted to the conditions
of the POW status. As discussed above, such rationale underscores Article 44(4) of
Additional Protocol I, according to which, while 'unprivileged belligerents' are
stripped of the right to POW status, they can benefit from POW treatment in re-
spect of due process guarantees.
4.3 The detaining power's own nationals
In relation to the status of a belligerent belonging to the nationality of the capturing
state or that of its ally, examples of such genus include members of Viet Cong,
who were South Vietnamese nationals, and the Taliban soldiers captured after the
coming into existence of the new Karzai government, which is allied to the United
States. One strand of argument is that a detaining power is not required to accord
POW status to its own nationals.134 Oppenheim/Lauterpacht explained that na-
tionals of the capturing state falling into its power while serving in the armed
forces of the adversary were disqualified from POW status in view of their traitor-
ous act.135 While this provided the underlying rationale for the decision of the Uni-
ted Kingdom Privy Council in the Oie Hee Koi case,136 this decision became the
subject of criticism. The argument made by Oppenheim/Lauterpacht entails a per-
nicious implication that traitorous citizens of a belligerent could be denied the pro-
tection of the Geneva Convention from the beginning of captivity, with no account
taken of the complexity of nationality and of the sense of allegiance.137 The propo-
nents of the teleological construction based on the humanitarian objectives of the
Geneva Conventions argue that international humanitarian law should apply to the
nationals accused of treason as well, and that they should be granted POW status
and all the safeguards as required under the Third Geneva Convention.138 The facts
that the definition of a prisoner of war in Article 4 does not contain reference to
nationality and that there was some precedent for disregarding altogether the ques-
tion of nationality, are cited to support their argument.139
134. See for instance, US Army Field Manual, supra, n. 84, <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>, para. 79.
135. Oppenheim, op. cit. n. 76, at p. 268.
136. Oie Hee Koi v. Public Prosecutor and connected appeals, Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, 4 December 1967, (1968) 9 British International Law Cases (B1LC) pp. 250-254, and
[1968] AC 829.
137. R.R. Baxter, 'The Privy Council on the Qualifications of Belligerents', 63 AJIL (1969) pp.
290 at 290-294. See also R.-J. Wilhelm, 'Peut-on modifier le statut des prisonniers de guerre?', 35
R1CR (1953) pp. 681, 684 and 686.
138. S. Elman, 'Prisoners of War under the Geneva Convention', 18 1CLQ (1969) pp. 178 at 180-
185.
139. Elman refers to the state practice of the United Kingdom during'the Boer War, in which the
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There are a few post-WWII US decisions that might provide succour to the sec-
ond view. In ex parte Quirin, the US Supreme Court ruled that hostile acts against
the Untied States by American citizens amounted to violations of the laws of war
committed by 'enemy belligerents'.140 In Re Territo, the application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a US citizen that served the Italian army was denied on the basis
that he was a prisoner of war.141 However, Rosas has questioned the effect of these
decisions on the basis that the express recognition of POW status was limited only
in the case of Territo, and in that case the reasoning was adduced with a view to
denying the petitioner a constitutional right available to US citizens. In that sense,
it may be contended that these decisions cannot serve to alter the traditional pre-
mise that the detaining power is not required to offer POW status to its own na-
tionals.142 Nevertheless, Rosas concedes that the decisive factor should be
'material allegiance' rather than formal nationality, referring to the members of
national liberation movements, and individual persons who have renounced their
nationality many years before the outbreak of the war but without their former
country (the detaining power) formally acknowledging this.143 It must be recalled
that the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadic case ruled that what matters
most was the sense of allegiance rather than mere nationality, enabling the grave
breach regime under the Fourth Geneva Convention to apply to the atrocities com-
mitted by Serbs against Muslims and Croats in the so-called Republika Srpska.144
This reasoning is equally applicable to the appraisal of the expression, 'fallen into
the power of the enemy', under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention,145 so
that even nationals of a detaining power should not be excluded from POW status
under the Third Geneva Convention while awaiting possible trials for treason.146
4.4 Judicial guarantees for detainees accused of war crimes
In the aftermath of World War II, national courts of several western allied powers
were asked to determine whether detainees of Axis nationals accused of war
crimes could plead minimum judicial guarantees underlying Articles 45 to 67 of
the 1929 Geneva Convention. Such pleas were rejected on the ground that there
was a well-established customary rule that those who have violated the laws of war
cannot avail themselves of the protection that they afford, with the captured mem-
Irish prisoners who had taken the oath of allegiance to the South African Republic were treated as
prisoners of war. Ibid., at pp. 181-182.
140. Ex parte Quirin (US Supreme Court, 1942), 37 AJIL (1943) p. 152. See also Colepaugh v.
Looney (US Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 1956), 23 ILR (1956) pp. 759-762.
141. Re Territo (US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 1946), (1946) 156 US FedR. (2d) 142.
142. Rosas, op. cit. n. 81, at pp. 385-386.
143. Ibid., at p. 387.
144. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 166.
145. Indeed in the Oie Hee Koi case, the counsel for the respondents made this point, arguing that
'[i]t is not patriotism or national allegiance which predominates but political allegiance': Oie Hee Koi
case, supra n. 136, 9 BILC, p. 242.
146. Even such nationals can benefit from basic guarantees equivalent to POWs under Art. 44(4),
as well as Art. 75 of Protocol I.
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bers of armed forces who have committed war crimes disentitled to claim the status
of POWs.147 The ICRC Commentary on the Third Geneva Convention criticises
that national legislation did not corroborate this interpretation.148 Indeed the ICRC
took initiatives to insert a provision designed to afford minimum procedural guar-
antees for individual persons accused of war crimes in the course of any judicial
proceedings. Such a move was prompted by the concern that it would be danger-
ous not to supply the accused with the guarantees embodied in a humanitarian law
treaty. This trepidation was borne out by the fact that war crimes trials in many
national courts were based on the use of special ad hoc legislation rather than on
the regular penal legislation and that a number of the accused persons were de-
prived of the protection of the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention prior to
the judicial pronouncement.149 At the Geneva Conference of Government Experts
in 1947, many Anglo-Saxon states were initially opposed to the idea of maintain-
ing the judicial guarantees of the Convention for those accused of war crimes until
after conviction. However, their position underwent a complete change, and in
conformity with the ICRC's proposal, they advanced that such prisoners of war
should continue to benefit from due process rights even after they had been judged.
Since then opposition to this innovative approach waned,150 and this principle is
recapitulated in Article 44(2) of Protocol I.
Article 85 of the Convention has introduced an obligation to offer prisoners of
war convicted of war crimes all the benefits accruing from the Convention. These
benefits encompass 'all the safeguards which the Convention provides', including
notification of the protecting power, assistance by a counsel, the right to be in-
formed of the procedure to be followed, and to call witnesses and an interpreter, as
well as the right of appeal. 151 While the application of Article 85 even in the post-
conviction period may be objected to as controversial,152 one can at least recognise
that such an innovative move has been influenced by the development of human
rights law. The marked significance attached to due process guarantees is demon-
strated by the principle that the denial of the right to a fair trial may constitute a
grave breach of the Convention as prescribed by Article 130.153 The same rationale
underpins the requirement, as laid down under Article 75(7)(b) of Protocol I, that
147. See inter alia, Yamashita Trial, the judgment of 4 February 1946 of the United State Supreme
Court: Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. 4, p. 1, (with one judge dissenting); and Rauter
case, 12 January 1949, the Netherlands Special Court of Appeal, ibid., Vol. 14, p. 116.
148. The Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. II-A, pp. 570-571;
and Commentary, GCIII, op. cit. n. 72, at p. 416.
149. Ibid., at p. 414.
150. Provost, op. cit. n. 28, at pp. 30-31.
151. Commentary, GCIII, op. cit. n. 72, at p. 423; and Ipsen, loc. cit. n. 114, at p. 94. Note that Art.
75(7)(b) of Protocol I provides such judicial guarantees for non-combatants accused of war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
152. Dinstein, op. cit. n. 90, at p. 114. Note that in the Kappler case, the Supreme Military Tribunal
in Italy ruled out the benefit of Art. 85 in relation to war criminals: Kappler Case, Supreme Military
Tribunal, Italy, (1952), 49 AJIL (1955) pp. 96 at 97.
153. Commentary, GCIII, op. cit. n. 72, at p. 422.
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even non-combatants accused of grave breaches of war crimes should be given the
due process guarantees.154
The approach followed in respect of the POWs accused of war crimes does not
appear consistent with the treatment of those persons who have committed perfi-
dious attacks under civilian disguise, war crimes which are expressly proscribed
under Article 37(1) of Protocol I and susceptible to the loss of POW status. A
proposal submitted at the end of the 1976 session of the Geneva Diplomatic Con-
ference by the Working Group of Committee III was that while losing both their
POW status and combatant status, they should benefit from treatment equivalent to
that provided for POWs in the Third Convention.155 It may be seriously questioned
how persons convicted of crimes against humanity or even genocide, the nature of
which are considered more grave than war crimes of perfidy or war crimes in gen-
eral,156 should remain beneficiaries of POW treatment. However, there may be lit-
tle practical difference in handling these two cases. According to Article 44(4) of
Protocol I, persons convicted of perfidy by not distinguishing themselves from
civilians can benefit from the rights and privileges akin to those afforded to POWs
under the Third Geneva Convention. It should be recalled that the former socialist
countries asserted that persons convicted of war crimes and crimes against human-
ity would forfeit their POW status and entered a reservation on this matter upon
their ratification of the Convention. Yet, their assumption was that such convicted
criminals would lose their entitlement to POW status only after they are con-
victed.157 suggesting that even according to their view war criminals would retain
combatant status.
5. INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT AND THE HUMANITARIAN
RULES
An attempt to extend the status of 'lawful combatants' and that of a prisoner of war
to those engaging in guerrillas and armed rebels against armed forces of a state has
faced a stonewall of opposition by a large number of states. Such a move has been
perceived to send a signal of recognising the legal status of members of such
groups and even the status of disputed territory. Additional Protocol II responds to
that apprehension of states by avoiding any reference to the terms, 'combatants'
and 'prisoners of war'. Instead the approach of Protocol II is to capture the wide
range of persons, with the field of application ratione personae covering all the
154. Commentary, Protocol I, op. cit. n. 98, at pp. 887-889, paras. 3131-3143.
155. Rosas, op. cit. n. 81, at p. 312.
156. M. Frulli, 'Are Crimes Against Humanity More Serious Than War Crimes?', 12 EJIL (2001)
pp. 329 at p. 344. Contrast, however, Prosecutor v. Kambanda (Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment
and Sentence, 4 September 1998, para. 14) in which crimes against humanity were recognised as more
serious than violations of Art. 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions 1949, with Prosecutor v.
Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals, 26 January 2000, paras. 65-69), where the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia refused to distin-
guish between them in terms of seriousness.
157. Commentary, GCHI, op. cit. n. 72, at pp. 415-416.
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persons 'affected by an armed conflict', within the meaning of Article 2(1).158
While Article 4 provides a non-exhaustive list of proscribed acts against such pro-
tected persons in an unconditional manner,159 Article 5 of Protocol II supplements
Article 4, laying down concrete measures of obligations to safeguard the rights of
the '[p]ersons whose liberty has been restricted', either by internment or detention.
Such an expression denoting the protected persons has been chosen in lieu of spe-
cific terms such as 'prisoners' or 'detainees' in order to capture all the persons
whose liberty has been circumscribed for reasons relating to the conflict.160
6. TRIBUNALS FOR DETERMINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF
PRISONERS
6.1 'Article 5 Tribunals'
The second sentence of Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention provides that:
'Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.'
This general requirement has been incorporated into national military manuals.161
Article 5 does not spell out clear guidelines on the terms and conditions under
which a 'competent tribunal' is constituted. Just as with limitations on the right to
a fair and public hearing as embodied in Article 14 of the ICCPR, proceedings for
determining the status of prisoners can be in camera to preserve national security.
It might be argued that in contrast to the prevailing interpretation of Article 45(2)
of Protocol I, which will be discussed below, such proceedings do not have to take
place prior to a trial for an offence.162
The meaning of '[s]hould any doubt arise' in relation to the inclusion of cap-
tured persons in any of the six categories enumerated in Article 4 is not certain. It
has been submitted that Article 5 sets out two criteria: procedural criterion and
158. According to the ICRC's Commentary on Protocol II, such persons include those 'who do not,
or no longer take part in hostilities and enjoy the rules of protection laid down by the Protocol for their
benefit' and who 'must ... conform to certain rules of conduct with respect to the adversary and the
civilian population': Official Records, op. cit. n. 98, Vol. VIII, p. 210; and Commentary, Protocol II,
op. cit. n. 34, para. 4485.
159. While implicitly connoting the ban on reprisals against protected persons, such an 'absolute'
and non-derogable nature of the rule embodied in Art. 4 can signify its jus cogens status: Commentary,
Protocol II, ibid., para. 4530 and n. 17.
160. Commentary, Protocol II, ibid., at p. 1384, para. 4564.
161. US Army, Operational Law Handbook (1997), JA 422, op. cit. n. 109, p. 18-19; US Army,
Operational Law Handbook (2002), op. cit. n. 110, Ch. 2, p. 16; and US Navy, Commander's Hand-
book of the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, op. cit. n. I l l , paras. 11.7 and 12.7.1.
162. Roberts, loc. cit. n. 18, at p. 23.
92 Y. Arai-Takahashi
factual criterion.163 First, according to the factual criterion, 'doubt' relates simply
to the question whether a person appertains to one of the six categories of 'lawful
combatants' as laid down in Article 4A. This criterion coincides with the 'quasi-
presumption' of POW status for all participants in hostilities.164 Second, in contrast
to the first, the procedural criterion means that 'doubt' arises only when a captured
person claims POW status before or at the trial. The United States 1997 Army
Regulation follows this position165 The second position seems to reverse the pre-
sumption, unless a claim for POW status is made. This is the view upheld by the
UK Privy Council in the Oie Hee Koi case.166
A question remains as to the meaning of a 'competent tribunal' under Article 5
(2) of the Third Geneva Convention, especially with regard to its composition,
competence and procedural rules. The reference to a 'competent tribunal' can also
be seen in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).
The original draft provision of Article 5(2) at the Stockholm Conference in 1949
referred to the requirement that the legal status of an apprehended person be deter-
mined by 'some responsible authority'.167 Subsequently at the Geneva Conference
it was proposed that the term 'responsible authority' be replaced by 'military tribu-
nal' in order to provide safeguards against the danger that decisions on the right of
a captive to benefit from POW status may be made even by a single non-commis-
sioned officer.168 However, the controversy over serious implications of bringing
an apprehended person before a 'military tribunal' led to the further amendment
that used the term, 'competent tribunal', leaving the scope of discretion to national
authorities as to the type of tribunals (military, civil or administrative).169 A captive
found not entitled to POW status by a 'competent tribunal' might be left with no
right to reassert such status before a judicial tribunal convened to examine whether
his/her act arising out of hostilities is a lawful 'belligerent act' or an criminal of-
fence.170 The ICRC's Commentary on Protocol I states that such omission allows a
captured person to run a 'double risk' of being accused of merely participating in
the hostilities, which does not necessarily constitute an offence, and of being de-
nied the same procedural guarantees as should be afforded to prisoners of war.171
163. Y. Naqvi, 'Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status', 84 RICR/1RRC (2002) pp. 571 at pp. 574-577.
164. Ibid., at p. 576
165. Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and
Other Detainees, (Washington D.C., Headquarters Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Marine Corps 1997) <http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/rl90%5F8.pdf>, para. l-6(b).
166. Public Prosecutor v. Oie Hee Koi, supra n. 134, [1968] AC 829.
167. 'XVIth International Red Cross Conference, Draft revised or new Conventions', p. 54, as
referred to in Commentary, GCIII, op. cit. n. 72, at p. 77.
168. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949 (Federal Political Department,
Bern) Vol. II-A, p. 388; and Commentary GCIII, ibid. Note, however, that upon the determination of
his/her POW status, the captured person must be tried by a military court of the detaining power: Art.
84 of Geneva Convention III.
169. Commentary, Protocol I, op. cit. n. 98, at p. 551, para. 1745. See also Bothe et al., op. cit. n.
163, at p. 260; and Naqvi, loc. cit. n. 163, at p. 579.
170. Naqvi, ibid., at p. 580.
171. Commentary, Protocol I, op. cit. n. 98, at p. 554, para. 1751.
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6.2 A 'competent tribunal' under Article 45 of Protocol I
Article 45(1) elaborates upon the succinct provision of Article 5 of the Geneva
Convention III. A participant in hostilities who is captured by an adverse party
must be presumed to be a prisoner of war, provided that:
(i) s/he claims the status of prisoner of war;
(ii) s/he appears to be entitled to such status; or
(iii) the Party on which s/he depends claims such status on his/her behalf by notification
to the Detaining Power or to the Protecting Power.172
The effectiveness of the prima facie presumption not only of lawful combatant
status but also of POW status is supported by the principle that in cases of doubt, a
captured person remains entitled to the POW status 'until such time as his status
has been determined by a competent tribunal'.173
Article 45(1) of Protocol I, which adopts a combined approach of both factual
and procedural criteria, purports to elucidate the imprecise meaning of Article 5 of
the Third Geneva Convention.174 Contrary to the position of Article 5(2) of the
Third Geneva Convention, the implication of Article 45 of the Protocol I is that
with the presumption of POW status, it assigns onus of proof to a capturing state
claiming that there is doubt as to the legal status of a captive.175 While such a novel
approach may cast doubt on the customary law status of Article 45(1) of Protocol
I, it is possible to describe a norm prescribing the general presumption of POW
status for all participants in hostilities as evolving into a customary rule.176 As Naq-
vi notes,177 the fact that for all the US non-ratification of Protocol I, the 1997 US
Army Regulation recognises the right of a captured person, who does not appear to
be a prisoner of war, to assert entitlement to POW status and to have this question
determined before a competent tribunal, suggests that the US treats such a right as
reflective of customary law. As discussed above, the practice of the United States
during the Vietnam War has contributed to the progressive transformation of the
presumptive status rule into a customary norm. While abandoning the initial ap-
proach that confined the application of POW status to the North Vietnamese regu-
lar forces, the United States decided to accord the privileged status to the Vietcong
as well.178
Article 45(2) in Protocol I has somewhat remedied the deficiency concerning the
absence of the right of a detained person who is not being held as a POW by a
'competent tribunal', to reassert such status before a judicial tribunal adjudicating
172. Art. 45(1), first sentence, Additional Protocol I.
173. Art. 45(1), second sentence, Additional Protocol I.
174. Commentary, Protocol I, op. cit. n. 98, at p. 544, para. 1726.
175. Ibid., at p. 456, para. 1730. See also Naqvi, loc. cit. n. 163, at p. 576.
176. Naqvi, ibid., at p. 592.
177. Ibid., at p. 593.
178. Mundis, loc. cit. n. 5, at p. 326.
94 Y. Arai-Takahashi
on the legality of his/her acts of hostilities.179 The 'judicial tribunal' in Article 45
(2) may differ from the 'competent tribunal' in Article 45(1).180 The 'judicial tribu-
nal' must re-examine the legal status of a captive who is tried for an offence arising
out of the hostilities and who, though not held as a prisoner of war by a 'competent
tribunal' under the first paragraph, claims such status.181 The ICRC Commentary
on Protocol I suggests that Article 45 of Protocol I adopts a 'two-tiered system'.182
First, a 'competent tribunal' must be set up to determine POW status where sub-
stantial doubt can be cast on the general presumption. Second, as stated by the
Rapporteur of Committee III when drafting Protocol I, in case a captive who is
held to be not entitled to a prisoner of war status is charged with an offence arising
out of hostilities, a 'judicial tribunal' must adjudicate de novo his/her legal sta-
tus.183 According to Article 45(2) of Protocol I, '[w]henever possible', the adjudi-
cation on legal status must precede the trial for an offence by a judicial tribunal,184
as all procedural protections accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Geneva
Convention hinge on such determinations. As the Commentary on Protocol I
notes, in some instances such determinations, on whose outcome Article 44(4)
depends, are possible only after examining the merits of the accusation in relation
to the compliance with the requirements prescribed in Article 44(3), especially the
requirement of carrying arms openly.185 The judicial tribunal, which may or may
not be the same one that tries the offence,186 can be either civilian or military,187 but
it must provide all the necessary procedural guarantees pursuant to the Third or the
Fourth Geneva Convention and, otherwise, in conformity with Article 75 of Proto-
col I.188 If a captive is held to be a prisoner of war, Articles 84 and 102 of the Third
Geneva Convention apply, with the consequence that s/he can be tried only by a
military tribunal applying procedural guarantees as afforded by that Convention.189
179. Official Records, op. cit. n. 98, Vol. XV p. 433, CDDH/III/338; and Commentary, Protocol I,
op. cit. n. 98, para. 1752.
180. Naqvi, loc. cit. n. 163, at p. 578.
181. Official Records, op. cit. n. 98, Vol. XV, p. 433, CDDH/III/338.
182. Naqvi, loc. cit. n. 163, at p. 579.
183. Official Records, op. cit. n. 98, Vol. XV, at 433, CDDH/III/338.
184. Commentary, Protocol I, op. cit. n. 98, para. 1755
185. Ibid., para. 1755.
186. Official Records, op. cit. n. 98, Vol. XV, at 433, CDDH/III/338.
187. Commentary, Protocol I, op. cit. n. 98, para. 1753.
188. Ibid., para. 1754
189. Ibid., para. 1753.
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7. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE TALIBAN AND THE AL QAEDA
DETAINEES
7.1 The legal status of Taliban soldiers captured prior to 5 December
2001
The United States government initially treated both the Taliban and Al Qaeda sol-
diers as 'battlefield detainees' and 'unlawful combatants', refusing to apply the
Third Geneva Convention both to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.190 However, on 7
February 2001, President Bush announced that the Third Geneva Convention, to
which both Afghanistan and the United States are parties, would apply to the
armed conflict between the Taliban and the United States, but not to the 'armed
conflict' between Al Qaeda and the United States.191 To that extent, the Bush ad-
ministration did not succumb to the dubious interpretation that the Taliban soldiers
were 'irregular armies' akin to those of warlords, who were not 'members of the
armed forces' within the meaning of Article 4A(1). Such an interpretation could
not have countered the objection that, although recognition was granted by only
three countries, the Taliban government exercised 'effective control' over most of
Afghanistan.192
Despite the pronouncement to apply the Third Geneva Convention to Taliban
soldiers, it was decided that since the Taliban soldiers did not meet some of the
four conditions of lawful combatants set out in Article 4A(2) of the Convention,
they would be stripped of the privilege to be treated as prisoners of war. According
to the Bush administration, the Taliban personnel failed to comply with the two
requirements of wearing a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance and of
undertaking operations pursuant to the laws and customs of war.193 The concern
that the Taliban (and Al Qaeda) captives would lose protective status was only
slightly assuaged by the subsequent announcement that they would nonetheless be
treated humanely, in accordance with the general principles of the Convention, and
that the United States would allow the ICRC access to each detainee.194
One policy-oriented explanation of the US intransigency over the legal status of
Taliban personnel is that they provided support to Al- Qaeda.195 The thrust of such
argument is that offering sanctuary to Al Qaeda personnel was tantamount to a
violation of international law that can warrant the denial of POW status to the
190. White House Spokesman, Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing, 28 January 2002. Available at <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01 >.
191. White House Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, 7 February 2002, at <http://
usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02020700.htm> or at <http://www.state.gOv/p/sa/rls/fs/7910.htm>.
Reprinted in this volume at p. 662.
192. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 894. See also the Tinoco Concessions Arbitration, supra n. 45, p.
369, which was grounded on the concept of effective control to meld the constitutive and declaratory
effects of recognition.
193. Aldrich, ibid., at p. 895.
194. White House Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (7 February 2002), supra n. 228.
195. Ibid.
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Taliban.196 However, while logistical support to Al Qaeda both in peace and in an
armed conflict is contrary to international law, this does not, ipso facto, amount to
a failure to abide by the requirements of the jus in bello.191 Such argument also sits
ill with the non-reciprocal nature of the obligations of the Geneva Conventions, as
evidenced by common Article 1(1), which provides the duty to 'respect and to
ensure respect' for the rules of the Geneva Convention '/« all circumstances'}91
There has also been a suggestion that the granting of POW status to the Taliban
and Al Qaeda soldiers would frustrate an attempt to obtain vital intelligence infor-
mation, as it would debar the US from questioning a POW on anything more than
his or her name, rank, date of birth and personal or serial number.199 However, such
a concern must not affect the juridical exercise of determining the POW status of
the captured Taliban soldiers.
The dearth of evidence, especially in relation to the failure of Taliban soldiers to
distinguish themselves from civilians, makes it difficult to warrant the argument
against the granting of POW status. It is questionable whether an assumption can
be made that all units of the Taliban forces were indistinguishable. Further, an
assumption that most Taliban soldiers might have breached the laws and customs
of war would not justify measures to treat all of them in a blanket manner. 200 Such
generalisation would create a slippery slope of abuse. It should be recalled that the
decisions of North Korea during the Korean War and of North Vietnam during the
Vietnam War to deny POW status to US soldiers was based on the argument that
the United States was .an aggressor state and that some of its personnel had com-
mitted war crimes.201
As explained before, it was the implicit understanding at the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference that the four defined criteria as set out in Article 4A(2) must be ful-
filled by members of the regular armed forces, militia and volunteer forces. The
United States could, however, have followed the mode of interpretation that the
four defined criteria under Article 4A(2) are only declaratory conditions for regular
forces under Article 4A(1), so that all the captured Taliban members should be
deemed as prisoners of war. Following this construction, the forcible transfer to
and confinement of Taliban captives at Guantanamo Bay would run afoul of the
requirement, as provided in Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention, that pris-
oners of war must be released and repatriated upon the termination of active hosti-
lities, except in case of pending criminal proceedings against them.202 Be that as it
may, the fact that, in harmony with the drafters' view, the United States has con-
196. Wedgwood, loc. cit. n. 5, at p. 895.
197. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 895.
198. Emphasis added.
199. Roberts, loc. cit. n. 18, at p. 24.
200. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 895.
201. Ibid., pp. 895-896. Such an argument implies that these two states regarded the requirement of
complying with humanitarian law as constitutive of the entitlement to POW qualification. It should be
noted that North Vietnam, together with other former Socialist countries, formed a reservation to Art.
85 of the Third Geneva Convention to the effect that perpetrators of war crimes, if convicted, would
not be entitled to POW status.
202. Rowe, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 317.
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sidered the four criteria to cover regular forces as well does not justify its continu-
ing failure to establish a 'competent tribunal' to determine the status of members of
the Taliban. As will be discussed below, according to Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention, until the 'doubt' over their legal status is fully resolved by a compe-
tent tribunal, members of regular armed forces like Taliban soldiers entertain the
presumption that they are ipso facto deemed as entitled to the rights and privileges
as POWs. The difficulty in interrogating those classified as POWs cannot be
pleaded to warrant the denial of, or the limitation upon, the basic rights accorded
to POWs. They can be compelled to disclose only limited information, and they
cannot be confined except in cases of penal or disciplinary sanctions.203 With re-
spect to those Taliban soldiers who may be guilty of war crimes, they could be
prosecuted while remaining POWs.204
In relation to the captured Taliban soldiers of foreign nationality, such as John
Walker Lindh (the US citizen) and Ai'rat Vakhitov (the Russian citizen),205 it could
be said that they were members of militia or volunteer corps forming part of the
Taliban's regular armed forces, as governed by Article 4A(1). The incorporation of
foreigners into the regular armed forces as fully integrated members does not im-
pair the qualification for prisoners of war status.206 As Cryer notes,207 to deprive
such foreign Taliban of POW status on the basis that they could be described as
mercenaries — a highly unlikely event —could not counter two objections. First,
Article 47 of Additional Protocol I, which stipulates that mercenaries are stripped
of POW status, is not part of customary law. Second, the motivation of such for-
eigners was not based on substantial financial reward. The foreign Taliban soldiers
should receive the same treatment as the Afghan Taliban soldiers, meaning that
they must be granted POW status until a competent tribunal within the meaning of
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention determines their legal status in light of
the four criteria.
7.2 Taliban soldiers captured in the post-Bonn process
To the knowledge of the author, there is no reported case of a foreign Taliban
soldier still operative in Afghanistan, so that the following analysis assumes that
all the active Taliban members are Afghan nationals. With respect to the Taliban
soldiers who have been captured by the US-led coalition forces or by the newly
formed Afghan armed forces since the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, it
must be noted that the nature of ongoing armed conflict has shifted from interna-
tional to internal armed conflict. This means that the international humanitarian
law applicable to international armed conflicts and concerning POWs has ceased
203. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 896.
204. Ibid.
205. See S. Shihab, 'Des "talibans" ruses detenus a Guantanamo refusent d'etre extrades vers Mos-
cou', Le Monde (14 August 2003) p. 4.
206. L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 2nd edn. (Manchester, Manchester
University Press 2000) at p. 199.
207. Cryer, loc. cit. n. 4, at pp. 70-71.
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to apply, with the result that only customary law applicable during internal armed
conflicts, namely, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and customary
parts of Protocol II apply to the new Afghan government and to their armed forces,
as well as to resurgent Taliban rebels. The Taliban soldiers have been converted
into insurgents who are aligned with the Al Qaeda and Mujaheddin fighters.
Since Afghanistan has become an ally of the United States, the Taliban remnants
have not 'fallen into the power of the enemy' within the meaning of Article 4A
chapeau of the Third Geneva Convention,208 and are not deemed prisoners of war
under that Convention. Note should also be taken of Article 87(2) of the Third
Geneva Convention, according to which the courts and authorities of the detaining
power must take into account 'the fact that the accused, not being a national of the
detaining power, is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that he is in its
power as the result of circumstances independent of his own will'. The obligation
to make allowance for the accused being a non-national can also be found in Arti-
cle 100(3) of the Convention relating to the death sentence.209
Captured Taliban soldiers are entitled to minimum guarantees as laid down in
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and to customary humanitarian rules
applicable to internal armed conflict, many of which may derive from Additional
Protocol II. It must be noted that the rights and privileges as laid down in Article 5
of Protocol II go beyond the minimum guarantees as provided in Article 75 of
Protocol I. A detaining power is enjoined to safeguard humane treatment, due pro-
cess rights, as well as even economic, social and cultural rights. It is arguable that
the rule embodied in Article 5 of Protocol II, which is distilled from the essence of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has reached the status of cus-
tomary law.210
7.3 The legal status of Al Qaeda soldiers
7.3.1 Preliminary observations
Controversy over whether the Al Qaeda soldiers are regarded as belligerents or
combatants entitled to the status of prisoners of war has had earlier equivalents.2"
Al Qaeda, which is not an insurgent entitled to the recognition of a belligerent
status, lacks international legal personality. The strict juridical construction might
lead to the conclusion that there existed no armed conflict between the coalition
forces and the Al Qaeda between 6/7 October and 5 December 2001, so that the Al
Qaeda members might be treated as 'international outlaws' or 'enemy combatants',
208. Commentary, GCIIf, op. cit. n. 72, at pp. 50-51.
209. All these provisions may, however, suggest that the Third Geneva Convention is based on the
assumption that prisoners of war owed no allegiance to the detaining power: Rosas, loc. cit. n. 81, at p.
384.
210. The ICRC's Commentary on Protocol II is silent on whether this provision has attained the
status of customary law: Commentary, Protocol II, op. cit. n. 34, paras. 4564- 4596.
211. Baxter, loc. cit. n. 108, at pp. 323-45; and Levie, op. cit. n. 71, at pp. 76-84.
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who would be disentitled to the benefits of humanitarian law. However, close ap-
praisal needs to be made of the argument that the conflict between the coalition
forces and Al Qaeda might be subsumed into the international armed conflict be-
tween the anti-terror coalition and the Taliban government.
Two modes of distinction need to be made for the purpose of appraising the
legal status of members of Al-Qaeda. First, as with the Taliban soldiers, the demar-
cation point of 5 December 2001 proves crucial to elucidating their legal status.
Second, analysis must focus on whether the nationality of Al Qaeda members,
namely the distinction between Afghan nationals and non-Afghan nationals, may
give rise to different outcomes in assessing their legal status.
7.3.2 Al Qaeda members captured prior to 5 December 2001
With regard to Al Qaeda members captured prior to 5 December 2001, query is
needed as to whether Al Qaeda was an independent force analogous to 'other mili-
tia' or 'other volunteer corps' within the meaning of Article 4A(2) of the Third
Geneva Convention. The Al Qaeda soldiers do not meet three of the four condi-
tions as set out in Article 4A(2). They have failed to distinguish themselves openly
from civilians by not wearing uniforms and a fixed distinctive sign and not carry-
ing arms openly. They have also patently avowed to disregard the laws and cus-
toms of war. As members of a transnational criminal organisation, Al Qaeda
soldiers are subject to trial and punishment under national criminal law.212 In that
sense, the Al Qaeda soldiers can be treated as 'unprivileged belligerents' under
humanitarian law, who are entitled only to minimum guarantees as laid down in
Article 75 of Protocol I. These guarantees include respect for physical and mental
integrity and due process rights, which are deemed as ripening into customary
humanitarian law. The Al Qaeda members are also beneficiaries of basic human
rights, such as the freedom from torture or other form of maltreatment, the right to
life, freedom from forced labour, and the freedom from ex post facto application of
criminal law, all of which are designated as non-derogable even in time of war
under international human rights law and as such considered as part of jus co-
gens.213 In the realm of international criminal law, their tactic of feigning civilian,
non-combatant status can be punished as a war crime of perfidy.214
Further, captured Al Qaeda soldiers can remain beneficiaries of the protections
under the Geneva Civilian Convention.215 Examinations are needed in respect of
the contingency of the guarantees under the Fourth Geneva Convention upon the
concept of nationality. In relation to the Al Qaeda soldiers of Afghan nationality,
their participation in armed hostilities render them 'hostile civilians' in the sense of
Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.216 While activities hostile to the secur-
ity of the belligerent state can exonerate it from ensuring rights and privileges of
212. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at pp. 893 and 898.
213. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, CCPR/C/2I/Rev. 1/Add. 11, para. 11.
214. See Gasser, loc. cit. n. 4, at pp. 557 et seq.
215. See Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 893, fh. 12.
216. See also Art. 51(3) of Additional Protocol I (which can be described as a customary rule); and
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civilians as laid down under that Convention, the right to be treated humanely and
the 'rights of fair and regular trial' are specifically classified as non-derogable un-
der that provision. Nevertheless, the entitlement to such minimum guarantees does
not mean the granting of immunity from prosecution for war crimes or other crim-
inal conduct.217
The overwhelming majority of the Al Qaeda soldiers are non-Afghan nationals,
who have not been sent by the states of their nationalities. As with foreign Taliban
members, they are not mercenaries, since their motivation can be explained less by
'the desire of private gain' than by spiritual conviction, without any expectation of
'material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to comba-
tants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party'.218 Again,
akin to the Taliban soldiers captured by the American forces in the post-Bonn si-
tuation, since these Al Qaeda captives are nationals of states with which the United
States have had 'normal diplomatic representation', the strict legal construction of
the concept of 'protected persons' under Article 4(1) and (2) of the Fourth Geneva
Convention suggests that the Civilian Convention might not apply to them.219 This
means that while the Al Qaeda soldiers belonging to the nationality of the co-belli-
gerent states which can exercise diplomatic protection against the United States,
such as nationals of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, preserve the status of
foreign nationals,220 they would be disentitled to the status of 'protected persons'
under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Indeed, the ICRC's Commentary on the
Fourth Geneva Convention envisions two classes of persons under this concept:
first, enemy nationals found within the national territory of each of the Parties to
the conflict; and second, the population of occupied territories, bar the nationals of
the occupying power.221 Those civilians placed outside the status of 'protected per-
sons' can remain beneficiaries of the protective regime under Part II (Articles 13-
26) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which, according to Article 13, applies to
'the whole of the populations' of the belligerent states, 'without any adverse dis-
tinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion'.
However, they would be excluded from the most substantive protections as laid
down in Part III (Articles 27-78), which are reserved only to 'protected persons'.
Art. 82 of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber
Code).
217. Gasser, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 568.
218. Art. 47(2) Additional Protocol I.
219. Rowe, loc. cit. n. 4 at p. 316 (though without distinction based on nationality or on the signa-
ture of the Bonn Agreement). See also the ICRC's Commentary on Geneva Convention IV, Art. 4,
which states that:
'They [nationals of a co-belligerent State] are not considered to be protected persons so long as the
State whose nationals they are has normal diplomatic representation in the belligerent State or with the
Occupying Power. It is assumed in this provision that the nationals of co-belligerent States, that is to
say, of allies, do not need protection under the Convention.'
J.S. Pictet, ed., Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civi-
lian Persons in Time of War, (hereinafter Commentary, GC1V), (Geneva, ICRC 1958) p. 48. Available
at <http://www.icrc.org/IHL>.
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The main criticism of such a rigidly formalistic view is that the subjective stan-
dard should also be used to assess nationality, taking into account the sense of
allegiance held by individual persons in question. In the Celebici case, a Trial
Chamber of the ICTY was asked to decide whether the Bosnian Serb victims of
the alleged offences could be considered 'protected persons' in relation to the de-
taining power, the Bosnian government. The Trial Chamber emphasized the need
to construe the notion of nationality flexibly and to take into account an individual
person's link to a specific ethnic group.222 In the subsequent Tadic case, the Appeal
Chambers of the ICTY reinforced this approach, ruling that the determination of
individual persons' status as 'protected persons' must focus on whether or not they
owe allegiance to a party to the conflict in whose hands they are, rather than on the
formal link of nationality.223 The Appeals Chamber confirmed this rationale in the
Celebici case.224 Such 'creative interpretation' by the ICTY serves to expand the
protective scope of the Geneva Conventions based on substantive links between an
individual and a party to the conflict.225 The line of reasoning that the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY adopted in the Tadic and Celebici decisions needs to be
imported into the appraisal of the nationality of Al Qaeda members. The non-Af-
ghan Al Qaeda members should be treated in the same manner as Afghan com-
rades, namely as 'hostile civilians' within the meaning of Article 5 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention.
7.3.3 Al Qaeda soldiers captured after 5 December 2001
Inquiry must be made with respect to the legal status of the Al Qaeda soldiers who
have been captured after the initiation of Bonn process. It may be argued that the
Al Qaeda remnants are considered as fully integrated into the Taliban-led insur-
gents in the post-Bonn process, so that they may be treated in the same manner as
Taliban soldiers, irrespective of their different nationalities. As discussed above,
the incorporation of aliens into a belligerent force is lawful, provided that such
persons are fully integrated as members of that force.226 The principle of non-dis-
crimination based on nationality is embodied in Article 16 of the Third Geneva
Convention. As with the Taliban soldiers, the Al Qaeda soldiers captured after the
initiation of the Bonn process are considered entitled to minimum guarantees as
stipulated in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as well as to custom-
ary law governing internal armed conflict, many of which may derive from Proto-
col II. In respect of Afghan nationals of Al Qaeda who have fallen into the hands
of the fledging Afghan army, or who have been transferred to the Afghan interim
government from the capturing US armed forces, they are treasonable, while en-
222. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo (the Celebici case), Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, 16 November 1998 at pp. 89-99, paras. 236-266, in particular paras. 251-266.
223. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 165-168.
224. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic and Landzo (the Celebici case), Case No. IT-96-21-A,
Appeals Judgment, 20 February 2001, paras. 51-106.
225. Provost, op. cit. n. 28, at pp. 39-40.
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titled to the minimum core of guarantees as outlined above. Members of Al Qaeda
who are nationals of the belligerent or co-belligerent parties, such as citizens of the
United States or the United Kingdom, are equally treasonable under the laws of the
respective countries while benefiting from such guarantees.
7.4 The Article 5 Tribunal and the Taliban/Al Qaeda soldiers
With respect to Taliban soldiers captured prior to the establishment of the Karzai
government, it must be questioned whether the persistent refusal of the US to grant
POW status to any and all of them suggests that the US has had no doubt about
their legal status. However effective and scrupulous it may be, the screening pro-
cedure for the captured Taliban soldiers before their transfer to Guantanamo Bay
for the purpose of criminal investigation cannot be equated to an Article 5 tribunal
under the Third Geneva Convention. This can be readily recognised by the denial
of the right of access to court inherent in Article 5. The practice of the US with
respect to the Taliban soldiers departs from the interpretation of Article 5 of the
Third Geneva Convention, as provided in the United States Army Field Manual
27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.227 According to this Manual,
'[t]he foregoing provision [Article 5] applies to any person not appearing to be entitled
to prisoner-of-war status who has committed a belligerent act or has engaged in hostile
activities in aid of the armed forces and who asserts that he is entitled to treatment as a
prisoner of war or concerning whom any other doubt of a like nature exists.'228
The US Field Manual 27-10 requires an 'Article 5 tribunal' to be a 'board of not
less than three officers acting according to such procedures as may be pre-
scribed'.229 As discussed above, wilful removal from a prisoner of war of the rights
of fair and regular trial amounts to a grave breach of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion.230
As regards the relevant tribunal to determine the legal status of Al Qaeda sol-
diers under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, their status is generally
accepted as raising little doubt and they are presumed to be non-POWs, so that
there may be no obligation to establish an Article 5 tribunal under the Third Gene-
va Convention. Yet, Article 45(1) of Protocol I requires that in case a captive
claims such status, such a person must be given the entitlement to POW status till
a competent tribunal determines his/her status. The onus of proof lies on the US
authorities. The requirement and the rights prescribed under Article 45(1) and (2)
of Protocol I have matured into customary law and as such are binding upon the
United States.231
227. Aldrich, loc. cit. n. 4, at pp. 897-898.
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The continuing controversy over the treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda soldiers at
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, especially the indefinite nature of their detention and
the prospect of military trials, has attracted significant international publicity and
widespread criticism. The ICRC expressed its concerns about the standard of treat-
ment at Guantanamo Bay.232 The ICRC has been involved in an on-site visit and
interviewing of detainees since 18 January 2002.233 In the meantime the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights indicated precautionary measures, ur-
ging the United States to adopt 'the urgent measures necessary' to have the legal
status of each of the detainees determined by a competent tribunal and to furnish
them with the legal protections commensurate with the 'minimum standards of
non-derogable rights'.234 In its letter dated 23 July 2002, the Inter-American Com-
mission reiterated the importance of providing 'effective and fair mechanisms' for
determining their legal status, and emphasized that both Article 5 of the Third
Geneva Convention and Article XVIII of the 1948 American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, which provides the right to access to court, must be
given 'practical effect'.235
A report that the United States is preparing for the military trials of seven detai-
nees, including two British citizens, who may be prosecuted on the basis of evi-
dence obtained through plea bargains and may face executions,236 has re-fuelled
unrest and furore among governments around the world. The Parliament Assembly
of the Council of Europe passed Resolution 1340 on 26 June 2003, calling on the
United States to allow the status of each of more than 600 combatants and non-
combatants in United States military custody, especially those held in Guantanamo
Bay, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Resolution 1340 also urged the
member states of the Council of Europe whose citizens are held either in Afghani-
stan and Guantanamo Bay or elsewhere to seek diplomatic protection or extradi-
tion of those threatened with the death penalty.237
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Despite the clamours of the international community, the Bush administration
has yet to establish a judicial procedure for clarifying the legal status of the detai-
nees, making their indefinite detention arbitrary. Nor has it offered minimum due
process guarantees, such as the right to contact legal counsel, in contravention to
the Third Geneva Convention and international human rights law. There is also a
denial of the right to contact their own consular representatives in violation of
Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.238 The most dis-
turbing of all may be the fact that among the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are a
number of children, including even those who are between 13 and 15 years of age
transferred from the Bagram Air Base in 2003.239 Subjecting 'child soldiers' to the
same harsh detention regime as adult detainees and to the possibility of capital
punishment amounts to violations of the customary equivalent of Article 77 of
Protocol I, which requires special safeguards for captured child soldiers, including
the prohibition of the death penalty for children who were younger than 18 years at
the time of the offence.240 Such guarantees must be proffered irrespective of their
POW status.241 Military trials for children would also contravene Article 40 of the
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides detailed guaran-
tees for children in judicial proceedings.
While issues of the constitutional review of the detentions in Camp X-Ray ex-
ceeds the limit of this paper, it must be noted that the efforts to secure the US
constitutional guarantees of habeas corpus and other due process rights before the
US courts have so far been unsuccessful on jurisdictional grounds.242 Nor has the
attempt to stretch the concept of diplomatic protection to secure the rights of a
detained person in another country bome fruit.243
It is incumbent on the Bush administration to put an end to the limbo status of
the detainees at Guantanamo Bay by establishing a system of adjudication on the
status of detainees and furnishing them with the rights and privileges as prisoners
of war until their status is determined on an individual basis. Even those detainees
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who are found not to meet the criteria for prisoners of war must be accorded the
minimum guarantees of humane treatment as required under the customary rule,
which derives from Article 75 of Additional Protocol I. The proposed military
commissions244 are hardly compatible with the right of accused persons to an 'in-
dependent and impartial tribunal' under international human rights law. It is also
hard to see such commissions meeting the requirement of providing a 'fair and
regular trial' within the meaning of Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention.245
Detainees who will stand trial are entitled to a fair trial, and the principle of equal
arms in defense must be given full effect so that they can exercise the right to a
legal counsel of their own choice, the right to appeal, the right to cross-examine
witnesses and the right not to incriminate themselves. Further, the subordination of
detainees solely of non-US nationality to the 'offshore regime' at Guantanamo
Bay, which does not benefit from the US constitutional guarantees such as the right
of habeas corpus, and to the military commissions, squarely contravenes the re-
quirement, as laid down in Article 102 of the Third Geneva Convention, that pris-
oners of war be treated in the same judicial procedures as in the case for members
of the national armed forces.
The late Judge Baxter observed that '[a]s the current tendency of the law of war
appears to be to extend the protection of prisoner-of-war status to an ever-increas-
ing group, it is possible to envisage a day when the law will be so retailored as to
place all belligerents, however garbed, in a protected status'.246 His insightful prog-
nosis of both the criteria for lawful combatancy and the expanding protective sta-
tus in future warfare can be most aptly presented at the current juncture, when
puddles of academic ink have been spilt over the continuing row about the qualifi-
cations of Al Qaeda and Taliban soldiers for POWs. While the unprecedented nat-
ure of atrocities committed by Al Qaeda in the September 11 attacks hardly needs
any further comment here, it is axiomatic, however trite, to emphasise the impor-
tance of the path of the humanitarian rule of law, along which democracy's endur-
ing fight against terror must proceed. The exigency arising from the fight against
terrorism must not distract the international community from the spirit underlying
the Martens clause and the yearning of humanity for reinforcing (rather than under-
mining) the edifice of humanitarian law, the bulwark against the retreat into barbar-
ity.
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